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Established companies have collaborated with startups for decades in order to enhance their 
capabilities in technology and innovation. However, in the recent years, the changes in the 
business environment have induced established companies to increase their collaboration with 
startups. Thus, startup activities of established companies have become a timely phenomenon. 
This study explores the startup activities of established companies by analyzing all the 
activity established companies conduct in collaboration with startups, related to startups and 
as startups. The aims of this study are to explore how, why and how extensively established 
companies engage in their startup activities. 
  
The theoretical background of this study is based on the previous discussions of corporate 
entrepreneurship. Corporate entrepreneurship describes various entrepreneurial phenomena 
appearing in corporations. It includes corporate venturing and strategic endeavors of 
entrepreneurial actions. The concept is broad and ambiguous, but scholars value its 
heterogeneity. A theoretical framework of the purposes and forms of corporate 
entrepreneurship is presented. The empirical research is based on a qualitative study. Eleven 
Finnish companies from varied industries provide the empirical research subject. The data is 
collected by semi-structured interviews, observation in events and by using secondary data 
sources, such as non-academic reports and company communications. The analysis method is 
content analysis. 
 
The findings suggest that the reasons to engage in startup activity vary from strict business 
goals to reputational and social purposes. Based on the empirical materials, established 
companies can be categorized into four categories in terms of their engagement in startup 
activities. The categories are: no startup activity, opportunists, special know-how exploiters 
and strategic exploiters. The main empirical findings also include the favorable aspects 
towards startup activity: keeping up with the changes of the business environment, developing 
the business, developing the organization, repute advantages, and social responsibility, as well 
as the negative aspects: encountering and finding the startups, risky partners, financial 
matters, the effect of industry, cultural challenges, and the impact of management guidelines. 
 
In conclusion, the study suggests that startup activities of established companies are one 
manifestation form of corporate entrepreneurship. Thus, corporate entrepreneurship can be 
conducted through startup activities. The studied companies mostly associate their activities 
to practical matters. They conceive different features of types of corporate entrepreneurship, 
but they do not plan their startup activities in the way the theory defines. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1 Established companies are searching for speed and innovativeness to 
their operations 
 
"In the new world, it is not the big fish which eats the small fish, it's the fast fish which eats 
the slow fish", states Klaus Schwab (2016), the founder and executive chairman of World 
Economic Forum. Global competition, the effects of digitalization and the disruptions of 
traditional industries urge established companies to develop fast and to renew themselves. 
Industries and operational environments are changing for example due to the accelerating 
technological changes, ongoing and extending globalization, urbanization, and the aging 
world. These cause pressure for established companies to renew their businesses and speed up 
their interest towards innovative and entrepreneurial solutions. (Dobbs, Manyika & Woetzel, 
2015; Helsinki Chamber of Commerce, 2016; KPMG, 2015; Pietarila, 2015.) Thus, 
established companies need to master innovativeness and regeneration in order to keep up 
with the changes of their business environment. 
 
According to the credit-rating agency Standard & Poor’s, the average life cycle of companies 
has shortened by 43 years since 1958, from the average lifetime of 61 years to the current 
lifetime of 18 years (Hoberman in Nesta, 2015, 4). Mutually, the time needed for building and 
growing an established company has shortened significantly. For instance, the valuation of 
Uber grew to 40 billion USD during 2009–2014, while the valuation of Facebook reached 
only 15 billion USD during its first years, 2004–2009. (Bonzom & Netessine, 2016, 11.) The 
shortened life cycles and timespans for building established companies cause pressure for 
renewal, which in turn affects the research, development and innovation practices of 
established companies. Many companies comprehend that not all of the most clever and 
useful ideas are produced inside their own organization. (Chesbrough, 2005, 2; Confederation 
of Finnish Industries & Tekes, 2014, 8; Hoberman, Mocker, Bielli & Haley, 2015, 4; Paavola, 
2016; Peltonen, 2016.) As Bonzom and Netessine (2016, 11) formulate it: “If you don’t create 
the things that will kill your company, someone else will”. 
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1.1.1 Startups can provide established companies with innovativeness and regeneration 
 
Startups can provide many advantages that established companies are craving for. For 
example, startups can teach corporations new concepts and techniques, which help them to 
survive in the changes of their business environment. (KPMG, 2014.) According to Bonzom 
and Netessine (2016, 11–14), corporations have three main reasons to co-operate with 
startups: the need to change, win-win outcomes and clear short-term or long-term value 
drivers. Also the need for fast development causes pressure for established companies to co-
operate with startups. (Helsinki Chamber of Commerce, 2016; KPMG, 2015; Pietarila, 2015.)  
 
In many industries, the disruptive innovations start off in a bottom-up direction from startups, 
especially regarding technology and digitalization. For that reason it is relevant for established 
companies to collaborate with startups and keep up with the developments of the industry. 
(Kohler, 2016; Mocker et al., 2015, 6–7; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015.) Examples of such 
disruptive, digital innovations with a startup origin are the nowadays worldwide taxi service 
application company Uber and Facebook, the company which first revolutionized and since 
then has had a tight grip on the social media (Boyd, 2015; Christensen, Raynor & McDonald, 
2015). Thus, open innovation, digitalization and new technologies are common reasons for 
established companies to start engaging in startup activities (Mocker et al., 2015, 8). 
 
Even though startup collaboration is distinctive to technology intensive industries and digital 
businesses, companies in any industry can benefit from co-operating with startups. Startups 
provide technological and digital solutions that can be applied to any industry. Moreover, 
there are startups operating in most industries. (Bonzom & Netessine, 2016, 6; Koskinen, 
2015; Mocker et al., 2015, 17). The need for regeneration and innovativeness applies to any 
industry, since digital disruption affects basically every industry, according to the top tier 
consulting company Bain & Company (2015). For instance, an established consumer goods 
company Diageo uses startups in their accelerator program in order to generate new spirit 
brands, even though the company is not connected to technology at all. (Bonzom & Netessine, 
2016, 8). 
 
In addition to innovations and new technologies, with the help of startup activities established 
companies seek rapidity to their modus operandi and a cultural change. Also experts, potential 
employees, new businesses and new markets are pursued through startup activities. 
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(Confederation of Finnish Industries & Tekes, 2014, 8; Helsinki Chamber of Commerce, 
2016; KPMG, 2015; Mocker et al., 2015, 17). Seeking growth is therefore a common reason 
for startup collaboration, since established companies can have difficulties in organic growth 
(Yoon & Hughes, 2016). 
 
There are many international examples of companies that believe and invest in startup 
activities. Companies such as Accenture, BBVA, BMW, Booz Allen, Coca-Cola, Cisco, Dell, 
Deutsche Telekom, Ericsson, GE, Google, Huawei, Kaplan, KLM, KPMG, Lloyds of 
London, MasterCard, MedStar, Microsoft, Nike, Pearson, PwC, Saint-Gobain, Siemens, 
Sprint, Telefonica, Unilever and WalMart are single examples of established companies from 
varied industries that value the advantages of startup activities and consider them to be a 
relevant part of their business and innovation activities (Burfield, 2014; Confederation of 
Finnish Industries & Tekes, 2014, 5–7; Mocker et al., 2015, 8-17; Paavola, 2016; Scheuble, 
2016; Wallis, 2016). Nine out of ten companies which invest the most in R&D worldwide 
also cooperate with startups (Bonzom & Netessine, 2016, 8). 
 
According to Yoon and Hughes (2016), both established companies and startups would be 
more successful if they, instead of competing against each other, collaborated with each other: 
the startups as developers of novel ideas and the established companies scaling and 
commercializing the ideas. The raison d’être and the root cause for corporate-startup activities 
is asymmetry: the complementing effect of two different kinds of organizations with different 
resources and capabilities (Alvarez & Barney, 2001; Minshall, Stelios & Probert, 2008; 
Vapola, 2011; Vapola, Tossavainen & Gabrielsson, 2008). Furthermore, according to the 
global innovation barometer research of GE, 85% of companies believe that the collaboration 
conducted with startups and entrepreneurs is the key for their future success. 47% of the 
respondents of the same barometer considered such collaboration to be an already established 
phenomenon and future reality. (GE, 2014, 51; 10.) According to the KPMG (2014) report, 
88% of corporations find startup collaboration necessary for their innovative capabilities and 
71% of startups find corporate collaboration necessary for their success. Thus, there is plenty 
of empirical evidence of the phenomenon and its significance. 
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1.1.2 Timely phenomenon both internationally and nationally 
 
The topic of corporations utilizing startups is very current both internationally and nationally. 
In the international context, organizations such as INSEAD Business School (2016), 
consulting company KPMG (2014; 2015) and innovation charity organization Nesta (2015) 
have published reports about corporate-startup collaboration in the recent years. Furthermore, 
the theme is discussed for example in the Global Innovation Barometer of GE (2014) and in 
Harvard Business Review (Kirsner, 2016; Yoon & Hughes, 2016). 
 
The topic is also relevant in Finland: The Confederation of Finnish Industries and Tekes 
(2014) have both published on the issue. The topic has also been widely discussed in the 
business news coverage, for example in Kauppalehti (Eljala & Kesä, 2015; Haapavaara, 2015; 
Kesä, 2015; Koskinen, 2015; Leskinen, 2016; Penttinen, 2015), and in business events held 
by the startup events Slush and Arctic15 (Confederation of Finnish Industries, 2015; Slush; 
Tekes, 2014), Helsinki Chamber of Commerce (2016), and consulting company PwC (2016). 
 
Regardless of the topicality of the phenomenon, collaboration between established companies 
and startups is no novel occurrence. It has been conducted and documented at least since the 
1980s (Doz, 1988). However, as the previous examples show, the topic has recently gained a 
great deal of attention and thus been raised to public discussion in a new way. Also companies 
themselves have begun to highlight their startup related activities in their corporate 
communications (Elisa, 2014; Fonecta, 2014; Fortum, 2016; Kone, 2015; Lassila & Tikanoja, 
2015; Nokia, 2015; S-Ryhmä, 2015; Tieto, 2014; UPM, 2015). 
 
Owing to practitioners, it is essential to explore this timely phenomenon also conceptually: 
how and why established companies engage in startup activities; is it about occasional pilots, 
positive corporate communications, a passing craze or sincere, long-term development and 
co-operation activity? Beyond the scholarly knowledge development, by researching 
established companies’ engagement in startup activities, other companies may learn about 
startup activities and their benefits and challenges. 
 
I conduct this study only from the perspective of established companies, since I want to 
achieve a holistic understanding specifically of the engagement of established companies. The 
phenomenon may be very different from the perspective of other parties involved in the 
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process. Established companies are the party with the most pressures of renewal. Startups are 
completely different kinds of organizations and hence have completely different pressures and 
motives in their business (Alvarez & Barney, 2001; KPMG, 2014; Minshall et al., 2008; 
Vapola, 2011; Vapola et al., 2008). Thus, within the limitations of the study, I find it more 
relevant to focus on established companies only. Furthermore, the holistic understanding of 
the engagement of established companies is relevant and valuable for the other parties too. 
Startups may learn to better understand established companies as their collaboration partners 
and the decisions they make regarding their startup activities. 
 
1.1.3 Startups and startup activities 
 
There are only a few attempts to define the concept or the term startup in the academic 
literature. Salminen (2014, 19) has defined startup as “an early stage business organization” 
which has existed a maximum of five years. Vapola (2011, 40) defines startups as 
“international new ventures” after the definition of Oviatt and McDougall (1994, 49): “we 
define an international new venture as a business organization that from inception seeks to 
derive significant competitive advantage from the resources and the sale of output in multiple 
countries”. Minshall, Mortara, Valli and Probert (2010), Minshall et al. (2008) and Shan, 
Walker and Kogut (1994) use the term startup in their academic articles, but they do not 
define it or clarify which kinds of companies they refer to. However, the term is in frequent 
use in the world of practitioners and represents the phenomenon better than the academic 
equivalents of entrepreneurial company (Alvarez & Barney, 2001), young innovative 
company (Schneider & Veugelers, 2010), high-growth SME (Smallbone, Leigh & North, 
1995), born global (Vapola et al., 2008), or small company (Doz, 1988), which are more or 
less accurately used to describe different kinds of startup companies. 
 
There are also non-academic definitions of the term startup. According to Blank and Dorf 
(2012), startup is a temporary independent organization or a temporary distinct organization 
inside another organization, which is created in order to develop a repeatable and scalable 
business model. Blank and Dorf (2012) understand the scalable business model as a way of 
producing value and profit. Their definition has been applied in academic publications too 
(Kohler, 2016). According to the definition of Ries (2011, 18–19), a startup is an 
expansionary company operating in an economically uncertain environment. According to the 
definition of Graham (2012), the only factor distinguishing startups from other alike 
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companies is growth. Thus, Graham (2012) finds startups as companies which are designed 
for growth and therefore all other specific characteristics of startups are related to fast growth. 
In conclusion, a summarizing definition of a startup can be compiled from the descriptions of 
Blank and Dorf (2012), Ries (2011) and Graham (2012): startup is a temporary and 
expansionary organization, which does not possess a ready business model and therefore it is 
searching for one. 
 
In public discussion the term startup is used very broadly to describe different types of small, 
young and innovative companies (Ministry of Economic Affairs and Employment, 2013). 
Thus, also in this study the term is used in its wide, empirical, practitioner sense and it refers 
to all kinds of small and young companies. With the term startup activity I mean all activity 
that established companies conduct in collaboration with startups, related to startups and as 
startups. Whereas the terms startup collaboration or startup co-operation only refer to a 
certain kind of external startup activity, the term startup activity differs from these by also 
including other forms of startup activity, for example acquisitions, internal startups and 
screening of startups. 
 
1.2 Theory of startup activities: corporate entrepreneurship 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship is a broadly researched topic and it has been in the interest of 
scholars since the 1980s (Covin & Miles, 1999; Miller, 1983; Morris & Paul, 1987; 
Schollhammer, 1982). The concept itself is very broad, which has complicated the 
development of the terminology and theory (Ireland, Covin & Kuratko, 2009; Sharma & 
Chrisman, 1999). It is suggested that the field of corporate entrepreneurship is widening, since 
companies which have not earlier demonstrated entrepreneurial characteristics are also 
beginning to be interested in entrepreneurial activities due to changes in the business 
environment (Phan et al., 2009). 
 
However, although the heterogeneity of the topic is causing challenges for the research and 
theory development, the variety is also appreciated and previous studies suggest further 
research on the heterogeneity of corporate entrepreneurship (Phan et al., 2009). According to 
the previous literature, it would also be relevant to explore and document the different ways 
of how established corporations conduct entrepreneurial activities (Dess, Ireland, Zahra, 
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Floyd, Janney & Lane, 2003). I respond to these suggestions by studying how corporate 
entrepreneurship and the startup activities of established companies are related to each other 
and by empirically documenting and analyzing a way of conducting entrepreneurial activities. 
In addition, since entrepreneurship is a very timely phenomenon especially in Finland 
(Finnish Government, 2016), it makes the earlier theoretical studies on entrepreneurial 
activities relevant. 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship research has not focused on startups or startup activities and 
therefore my study explores the heterogeneity of corporate entrepreneurship. Kohler (2016) 
discusses corporate-startup engagement spectrum and Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015) 
discuss engaging with startups in a very similar way as I understand startup activities. 
However, the spectrum of Kohler (2016) is not as wide as my understanding of startup 
activities, since his focus is in corporate accelerators. My theoretical contribution is therefore 
to explore the concept of corporate entrepreneurship in the context of startup engagement. 
Since my research emphasizes empirical relevancy, it is justified to study the concept of 
corporate entrepreneurship from an empirical perspective, in other words from the perspective 
of the phenomenon of startup activities. The phenomenon is currently common among 
established companies. However, literature lacks the acquaintance of the significance and 
essence of startup activity as an entirety for established companies. Hence the research is 
falling behind from the practical business life. 
 
In this study I do not cover previous literature on what makes a company entrepreneurial and 
which are the dimensions of entrepreneurial companies (Covin & Miles, 1999). I also do not 
take a stand on entrepreneurship or entrepreneurs (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). I also delimit 
the direction which explores the individual level of corporate entrepreneurship, for example 
directors (Holcomb, Ireland, Holmes Jr. & Hitt, 2009), since I am interested in the 
organization and company level. Moreover, I leave out previous literature on innovation and 
open innovation (Chesbrough, 2006), since the focus of my study is not merely on innovation 
and since open innovation is a separate, extensive theoretical discussion. 
 
1.3 Research objectives and questions
 
In this study, I analyze startup activities of established companies from the perspective of the 
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established companies. I outline this research based on the phenomenon and do not focus on 
any specific industry or case company. 
 
The research objective of the study is the following: 
 
The purpose of this study is to describe and analyze corporate entrepreneurship in the form of 
startup activity. 
 
I explore the phenomenon with the help of the following research questions: 
 
(1) How do established companies engage in startup activities? 
(2) Why or why not do established companies engage in startup activities? 
(3) How extensively do established companies engage in startup activities? 
 
1.4 Structure of the study 
 
In chapter 1 I introduce the empirical and theoretical background of my study, the research 
objective and research questions, and lastly how this research report is organized. In chapter 2 
I present the concept of corporate entrepreneurship as the theoretical background of the 
research. The second chapter concludes with the theoretical framework of the forms and 
purposes of corporate entrepreneurship engagement. 
 
In chapter 3 I present the research subject, that is the companies and interviewees involved in 
this study. I also broadly report the methodological choices I have made during the research 
process and present how I have collected the research material and conducted the analysis. 
Moreover, I discuss the trustworthiness of the research. 
 
In chapter 4 I report my empirical findings. Firstly, I describe how established companies 
engage in startup activities. Secondly, I present both favorable aspects, for example the 
reasons for startup activity, and negative aspects, for example challenges which established 
companies experience in their startup activity. Lastly, I suggest a categorization of established 
companies engaging in startup activities. 
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In chapter 5 I present the conclusions, theoretical and empirical reflection and managerial 
implications of this study. I also take the limitations of the study into consideration. In 
addition, I suggest further research topics on the ground of my findings and conclusions.  
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2 CORPORATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
 
 
In this chapter I present the theoretical background of the concept corporate 
entrepreneurship, which is the theoretical background of this study. The concept refers to 
entrepreneurial phenomena and activities in established companies. The concept has been 
broadly studied since the 1980s and the interest of scholars has remained until recent years. 
(Kohler, 2016; Morris, Kuratko & Covin, 2008; Phan et al., 2009.) 
 
The concept of corporate entrepreneurship originates from the combination of 
entrepreneurship and strategic management theory (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009, 1). Both 
scholars and practitioners began to find the entrepreneurial characteristics, growth, innovation 
and flexibility, as something that is relevant and interesting also for established companies 
(Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990, 17). Organizational transformation and strategic renewal have 
therefore attracted both scholars and practitioners, which has aroused interest in the concept 
of corporate entrepreneurship (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990). The phenomenon of corporate 
entrepreneurship is said to be an “inevitable byproduct of organizational activity”, and when 
understood in this sense, there has been corporate entrepreneurship as long as corporations 
have existed in the world of business (Covin & Kuratko, 2010, 207).  
 
In this chapter I firstly present the concept of corporate entrepreneurship and its key themes. 
Secondly, I describe the two sub-concepts of corporate entrepreneurship: corporate venturing 
and strategic entrepreneurship. I also review how startups are covered in the previous 
literature of corporate entrepreneurship. Lastly, I present the theoretical framework of the 
study. The theoretical framework summarizes the forms and purposes of corporate 
entrepreneurship that are found in the literature presented in this chapter. 
 
2.1 Ambiguous concepts of entrepreneurial phenomena 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship refers to entrepreneurial, renewal and innovation related 
activities and phenomena inside established organizations (Covin & Kuratko, 2010, 207). It is 
a bipartite concept describing the process of organizational renewal and emergence of new 
businesses inside organizations. It consists of two sub-concepts, corporate venturing and 
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strategic entrepreneurship. The sub-concepts are different, but still connected and 
complementary. (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990; Morris et al., 2008, 8; Phan et al., 2009.) Corporate 
venturing describes “the birth of new businesses inside organizations” and strategic 
entrepreneurship “the transformation of organizations through renewal of the key ideas on 
which they are built”. The concept of corporate entrepreneurship describes not only the 
content of these two phenomena but also the processes related to them. (Guth & Ginsberg, 
1990, 5.) The recent concept of corporate entrepreneurship and its duality by Morris et al. 
(2008, 81) is illustrated in Figure 1, and the earlier description of corporate entrepreneurship 
by Guth and Ginsberg (1990, 7) in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Corporate entrepreneurship according to Morris et al. (2008, 81) 
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Figure 2 Corporate entrepreneurship according to Guth and Ginsberg (1990, 7) 
 
Sharma and Chrisman (1999, 18) define corporate entrepreneurship as follows: “- - the 
process whereby an individual or a group of individuals, in association with an existing 
organization, create a new organization, or instigate renewal or innovation within that 
organization”. Corporate entrepreneurship describes the entrepreneurial characteristics of 
business, in other words “the identification and exploitation of opportunity in the face of 
resource constraints”, in the context of corporations (Phan et al., 2009, 198). Also Stevenson 
and Jarillo (1990) define corporate entrepreneurship through the qualities of entrepreneurship, 
such as opportunity seeking, attitudes of individuals, minor consequences of failure when 
exploiting opportunities, and informal networks. The entrepreneurship theory is emphasized 
particularly when the research and theory of corporate entrepreneurship is regarded to focus 
too much on corporate venturing and neglect other entrepreneurial phenomena. In addition to 
new business creation, a significant part of the corporate entrepreneurship theory is also “the 
ability of corporations to act entrepreneurially”. (Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990, 25.) 
 
The concept of corporate entrepreneurship does not have an unambiguous and unanimous 
definition, since the term is used to describe various organizational phenomena (Covin & 
Kuratko, 2010, 207; Covin & Miles, 1999, 48; Guth & Ginsberg, 1990, 6; Kuratko & 
Audretsch, 2009, 2). The terminology of corporate entrepreneurship is not systematized and 
among scholars there is plenty of confusion about the definitions. Due to the disordered usage 
of the terminology, it has been challenging for the scholars to contribute and develop the 
theory of corporate entrepreneurship. (Ireland et al., 2009; Sharma & Chrisman, 1999.) 
Despite the confusion caused by multiple meanings of the concept, many scholars suggest a 
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broader understanding of corporate entrepreneurship rather than a narrower and a limited 
view. A broader view on the concept is found to support the heterogeneity of the 
manifestation of the concept. (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990.) 
 
According to Covin & Miles (1999), innovation is the key perspective in corporate 
entrepreneurship and according to Kohler (2016), some corporate entrepreneurship activities 
are focused on open innovation. Also Phan et al. (2009, 204) note that since corporate 
entrepreneurship research emphasizes innovation, corporate entrepreneurship and innovation 
management research are partly overlapping. The overlapping of corporate entrepreneurship 
and innovation research is also found among the topics of strategic entrepreneurship and 
strategic innovation (Hamel & Prahalad, 1995; Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009). In addition, 
corporate entrepreneurship may be considered interchangeable with its both sub-concepts, 
corporate venturing and strategic entrepreneurship (Covin & Kuratko, 2010, 207; Ireland et 
al., 2009; Kuratko & Aldretsch, 2009). These add to the challenges regarding the confusion of 
corporate entrepreneurship terminology. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of corporate entrepreneurship is varied and broad. The 
variety and broadness partly results from the inconsistent terminology and partly from the 
phenomenon itself. There are many research directions on corporate entrepreneurship. For 
instance, some aim to explain what makes a company entrepreneurial and which are the 
dimensions of entrepreneurial companies. Other scholars have focused on the entrepreneurial 
behavior, and some explore the interface of strategy and corporate entrepreneurship. (Covin & 
Miles, 1999; Lant & Mezias, 1990.) However, although the variety is causing challenges for 
the research and theory development, it is also appreciated among the scholars: the previous 
research suggests further research on the heterogeneity of corporate entrepreneurship (Phan et 
al., 2009). 
 
2.1.1 Survival strategy for competitive business environments 
 
In the corporate entrepreneurship literature, the business environment is described as highly 
competitive. Furthermore, these competitive conditions of corporations are stated to require 
entrepreneurial, in other words innovative, renewing and resource aware, strategies. (Ireland 
et al., 2009; Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009; Morris et al., 2008; Peltola, 2012.) Corporate 
entrepreneurship is described to include ways of how to separate oneself from the rivals 
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within the own industry (Covin & Kuratko, 2010, 212). Also earlier research connects 
corporate entrepreneurship with a competitive environment (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990). Thus, 
corporations seem to exploit corporate entrepreneurship when facing competition and changes 
in their operational environment. 
 
Entrepreneurial strategies are regarded as a way of responding to major changes in the 
business environment (Lant & Mezias, 1990). Mutually, the business environment is found to 
affect corporate entrepreneurship. The environment either raises opportunities or offers 
competition, which in turn direct companies to adopt a more entrepreneurial direction. (Guth 
& Ginsberg, 1990, 7.) Thus, the external business environment is emphasized in corporate 
entrepreneurship literature, and corporate entrepreneurship is called “survival strategy” for 
companies in competitive business environments (Peltola, 2012, 44). It may be concluded that 
the fundamental purpose of corporate entrepreneurship is therefore to aid and provide 
corporations with capabilities they need in their changing and competitive business 
environments.  
 
2.1.2 Entrepreneurial phenomena across the organizational levels 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship can be conducted on many organizational levels and locations. 
(Ireland et al., 2009.) According to Phan et al. (2009, 198), corporate entrepreneurship on 
different organizational levels is not detached or independent, but interconnected with each 
other. According to Hornsby, Naffziger, Kuratko and Montagno (1993), both individual and 
organizational levels have separate roles in corporate entrepreneurship processes. 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship manifests itself in different ways on different organizational 
levels. Individual employees may represent individual entrepreneurial cognitions or 
characteristics and therefore be able to recognize and exploit entrepreneurial opportunities. 
(Ireland et al., 2009.) The individual level may also show in the desire to develop innovative 
capabilities of the individuals within the organization, in other words of the employees 
(Hornsby et al., 1993). 
 
Top management members are also individuals in the organization and their capabilities can 
too be developed as employees’ capabilities. However, top management is regarded as a 
separate level due to its special role in the organization. According to Dess et al. (2003), top 
 20 
management has a significant role especially in fostering internal corporate entrepreneurship. 
Corporate entrepreneurship is also suggested to arise among the top management as their 
entrepreneurial strategic visions. (Ireland et al., 2009.) 
 
There is yet another organizational level of corporate entrepreneurship. Corporate 
entrepreneurship manifests itself on the organization or company level in the organizational 
structure, culture, resources and capabilities and reward systems. (Ireland et al., 2009.) On the 
organization level corporate entrepreneurship may also be utilized as a direction or theme of 
the corporate strategy. This is also described as the dominant logic of the company. (Kuratko 
& Audretsch, 2009.) Entrepreneurial strategies, which are a clear form of organization level 
manifestation, are regarded as one form of corporate entrepreneurship. (Kuratko & Audretsch, 
2009; Morris et al., 2008). 
 
In sum, both management and employee involvement is relevant, since both bottom-up and 
top-down processes are needed in corporate entrepreneurship (Phan et al., 2009, 202). In 
addition, Phan et al. (2009, 204) note that corporate entrepreneurship should not be 
centralized in and practiced from a specialist function. This emphasizes the importance of 
having entrepreneurial phenomena throughout the organization. Also according to Ireland et 
al. (2009, 25), corporate entrepreneurship is conducted extensively throughout the 
organization, through “an entrepreneurial strategic vision, a pro-entrepreneurship 
organizational structure, and entrepreneurial processes and behavior as exhibited across the 
organizational hierarchy”. Furthermore, Kuratko, Ireland, Covin and Hornsby (2005) note 
that when implementing corporation entrepreneurship, participation of the middle and lower 
level of the organization is significant. These notions represent the relevance of extensive 
corporate entrepreneurship throughout the organization. 
 
2.2 Corporate venturing 
 
Corporate venturing may be the most consistently applied concept in corporate 
entrepreneurship literature. It is also the origin of the concept corporate entrepreneurship, 
since corporate entrepreneurship first meant new business generation (Covin & Kuratko, 
2010). Corporate venturing refers to “new business creation in the corporate context”. 
(Ireland et al., 2009.) It can also be defined as “new-business entry by established firms”, 
 21 
which does not require new business organizations (Covin & Kuratko, 2010, 207) or wider as 
“a set of entrepreneurial phenomena through which new businesses are created by, added to, 
or invested in by an existing corporation” (Covin & Kuratko, 2010, 212). 
 
Corporate venturing refers to venturing and innovation activities pursuing to create new 
businesses. Its aim is thus to create new businesses and integrate them to the established, 
existing business of the company. (Phan et al., 2009, 198-199.) However, also direct equity 
investments or investments in venture capital funds can be classified as corporate venturing, 
even though in this form the businesses already exist and investing does not create a 
completely new business (Miles & Covin, 2002). 
 
It is also noteworthy that not all new businesses inside corporations are unambiguously results 
of corporate venturing. Also many forms of strategic entrepreneurship may produce new 
businesses. (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009.) It remains unclear, whether new businesses arisen 
from strategic entrepreneurship related activities are labelled as strategic entrepreneurship or 
whether they can be categorized as corporate venturing, since previous theoretical discussion 
does not take a stand on this question. I now discuss the concept of corporate venturing 
further by presenting its purposes and different modes of how established companies can 
engage in it.  
 
2.2.1 Purposes of corporate venturing 
 
According to Tidd and Taurins (1999), there are two different main purposes for corporate 
venturing, whereas Miles and Covin (2002) present three main aims.  
The purposes of Tidd and Taurins (1999) are: (1) leveraging, for example exploring new 
markets or developing new products with the existing capabilities the company possesses, and 
(2) learning, for example to get access to new capabilities which can be exploited in current 
markets and products. Miles and Covin (2002) suggest that the aims of corporate venturing 
are (1) to create innovative capabilities in order to develop the company to a more 
entrepreneurial direction, (2) to either enhance value production with current capabilities or to 
gain capabilities from new, less explored areas, and (3) to gain short-term financial profits. 
 
The latest and widest suggestion about the purposes of corporate venturing is presented by 
Covin and Kuratko (2010). Their list of the reasons is: (1) “to exploit underutilized 
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resources”, (2) “to extract further value from existing resources”, (3) “to introduce 
competitive pressure onto internal suppliers”, (4) “to spread the risk and cost of product 
development” and (5) “to divest non-core activities”. These motives indicate that the ultimate 
reason for corporate venturing does not necessarily need to be new business creation. New 
businesses may also be created in order to reach some other purpose, such as new product 
development. (Covin & Kuratko, 2010, 208-209.) 
 
2.2.2 Three modes of corporate venturing 
 
Corporate venturing can be conducted in three different modes: internal, cooperative and 
external, depending on the ownership of the new ventures. However, not all studies recognize 
the cooperative mode of corporate venturing. (Covin & Kuratko, 2010, 207; Morris et al., 
2008; 81; Sharma & Chrisman, 1999.) Furthermore, also four modes of corporate venturing 
are suggested. In this view the internal and external modes have been divided into direct and 
indirect modes. The modes are: direct internal venturing, direct external venturing, indirect 
internal venturing, and indirect external venturing.  Here direct refers to direct investments 
between the established company and the small company and indirect to investments made 
with the help of intermediaries, such as venture capital funds. (Miles & Covin, 2002.) 
 
Corporate entrepreneurship has traditionally mostly discussed the forms of internal venturing 
(Burgelman, 1983; Guth & Ginsberg, 1990). In recent corporate entrepreneurship research, 
corporate accelerators suit this mode of corporate venturing (Kohler, 2016). Also corporate 
incubation, such as generating and supporting internal spin-offs, can be understood as internal 
venturing (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). The mode of cooperative venturing may also be 
called joint corporate venturing or collaborative corporate venturing. Joint ventures naturally 
belong to this mode. (Covin & Kuratko, 2010). 
 
External corporate venturing is often explored when established companies pursue short-term 
financial benefits (Covin & Kuratko, 2010). Spin-offs originated at universities are also 
mentioned as one source for corporate venturing (Phan et al., 2009). This form of corporate 
venturing may be classified either as external or cooperative mode, depending on how much 
the established company is involved in the spin-off from the beginning. 
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2.3 Strategic entrepreneurship 
 
Strategic entrepreneurship refers to the activities among corporate entrepreneurship which 
aim at renewal and at the ability to compete and take risks (Phan et al., 2009, 199). In other 
words, it combines the opportunity-seeking entrepreneurial behavior and the advantage-
seeking strategic behavior (Ireland, Hitt & Sirmon, 2003). Strategic entrepreneurship is the 
term in corporate entrepreneurship literature describing most clearly the interface of strategy 
and entrepreneurship theories. However, also the concept of strategic entrepreneurship is 
ambiguous and used inconsistently. (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009.) 
 
Entrepreneurship cannot be simplified and understood only as actions in organizations, since 
it also describes the entrepreneurial mentality. In companies this means that entrepreneurship 
may manifest itself on an organizational level, for example as a strategic theme, and not only 
in single actions, for example in investments. (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009.) Strategic 
entrepreneurship does not necessarily aim to create new businesses. It rather describes more 
broadly all kinds of entrepreneurial activities which take place in corporations. However, 
strategic entrepreneurship may also result in new businesses. (Covin & Kuratko, 2010.) 
 
Strategic management and entrepreneurship discussions have been focusing on several similar 
themes and topics, but there have been only minor integration efforts. Corporate 
entrepreneurship and strategic management overlap especially when the focus is on how large 
businesses perform and how corporate entrepreneurship performs. It is even stated that 
strategic management has appropriated certain topics from entrepreneurship studies. (Meyer, 
2009.) However, in this study I do not explore the performance of businesses or corporate 
entrepreneurship further than representing this explaining notion of the history of the 
academic discussions. 
 
I now discuss the concept of strategic entrepreneurship further by first representing its five 
main types (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009). The five main types concretize the concept of 
strategic entrepreneurship and its purposes, for example why companies engage in it. I then 
discuss the differences of an entrepreneurial strategy, a strategy with entrepreneurial features, 
and a strategy for entrepreneurship, a strategy for implementing the entrepreneurial activities 
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of the company (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009; Morris et al., 2008). This clarifies the 
terminological confusion and specifies the two core functions of strategic entrepreneurship. 
 
2.3.1 Five types of strategic entrepreneurship 
 
Strategic entrepreneurship can be divided into five types, which are (1) “sustained 
regeneration”, (2) “organizational rejuvenation”, (3) “strategic renewal”, (4) “domain 
redefinition” and (5) “business model reconstruction” (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009). The 
division into four types is first made to the main concept, corporate entrepreneurship (Covin 
& Miles, 1999; Dess et al., 2003). It is later connected with the concept of strategic 
entrepreneurship, and at the same time the last type, business model reconstruction, is added 
(Morris et al., 2008; Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009). The same five types with differing names 
are also listed and described by Covin & Kuratko (2010) as the five areas of strategic 
entrepreneurship. The five types of strategic entrepreneurship are presented in Figure 4. The 
four types of strategic entrepreneurship are also described as “labels” (Covin & Miles, 1999). 
This name represents the inexact borders and definitions of the types. The types describe both 
how companies engage in strategic entrepreneurship and what are their purposes. 
 
 
 
Figure 3 Five types of strategic entrepreneurship (after Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009) 
 
When companies create cultures, processes and structures aiming at fast and constant new 
product and service launches and new market entries, it is called sustained regeneration. 
Sustained regeneration is regarded as the most commonly recognized type of corporate 
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entrepreneurship. In sustained regeneration, companies pursue high innovativeness and foster 
their innovative capabilities. (Covin & Miles, 1999; Dess et al., 2003.) The core of sustained 
regeneration is constant entrepreneurial activities. Also new businesses can arise inside 
corporations when launching new products and services or getting access to new markets. 
(Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009.) 
 
Exploiting corporate entrepreneurship in developing the organization of the company is called 
organizational rejuvenation. Organizational rejuvenation recognizes the entrepreneurial 
phenomena which aim for improved internal operations or internal resource allocation. The 
purpose is not to change the strategy of the company, but to improve the strategy execution 
through entrepreneurial activities which produce organizational innovations. (Covin & Miles, 
1999.) The aim of organizational rejuvenation is not to change the strategic direction, product 
or service offering or prevailing markets. The changes are only targeted in the organization 
and its operations, and they may be smaller or multiple or the entire organization may be 
completely redesigned at once. (Kuratko & Adretsch, 2009.) Organizational rejuvenation can 
also simply be called organizational renewal (Hurst, Rush & White, 1989). 
 
Strategic renewal refers to the entrepreneurial actions which change the external position of 
the company on its markets. In strategic renewal companies employ a new strategic direction. 
(Covin & Miles, 1999.) However, a new strategy does not necessarily denote strategic 
renewal, if it is similar to the old ones. Strategic renewal requires significant repositioning in 
the competitive environment. (Kuratko & Aldretsch, 2009.) 
 
Domain redefinition describes how companies create first or early mover opportunities in new 
markets through corporate entrepreneurship activities. Companies seek a pioneer position and 
opportunities to create new industry standards. (Covin & Miles, 1999). Domain redefinition 
may be considered to describe the same phenomenon as the concepts of blue ocean strategy, 
market pioneering and bypass strategy (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009, 9; Kim & Mauborgne, 
2005; Fahey, 1989; Golder & Tellis, 1993). 
 
The fifth type of strategic entrepreneurship, business model reconstruction, is defined and 
described least accurately. It represents designing and redesigning the core business model or 
models of a company. Companies may employ business model reconstruction by outsourcing 
or by applying vertical integration, for example by increasing the amount of functions in their 
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own control with the formerly outsourced functions. However, the linkage between 
entrepreneurial phenomena of companies and business model reconstruction is not described 
as clearly as the linkage between the other four types of strategic entrepreneurship. (Kuratko 
& Audretsch, 2009.) 
 
2.3.2 Entrepreneurial strategy or strategy for entrepreneurship? 
 
Strategic entrepreneurship can be divided into entrepreneurial strategy and strategy for 
entrepreneurship. Entrepreneurial strategy means a strategy of a company which has 
entrepreneurial features. Strategy for entrepreneurship describes the ways of executing 
company-wide entrepreneurial activities. (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009; Morris et al., 2008.) 
However, especially the term entrepreneurial strategy is ambiguous and applied in varied 
contexts in the research of strategic entrepreneurship. Although strategic entrepreneurship is 
defined as the sub-concept of corporate entrepreneurship, Ireland et al. (2009) find that 
entrepreneurial strategy describes the same phenomenon as corporate entrepreneurship 
strategy, the main concept. Nevertheless, most researchers regard entrepreneurial strategy as a 
sub-concept of strategic entrepreneurship. (Ireland et al., 2009; Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009; 
Morris et al., 2008.) 
 
Entrepreneurial strategy refers to extensive entrepreneurial behavior in the organization and 
continual rejuvenation of the organization (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009; Morris et al., 2008). 
Entrepreneurial strategy is also closely related to innovation and risk taking (Sonfield & 
Lussier, 1997). Morris at al. (2008, 194) define entrepreneurial strategy as “a vision-directed, 
organization-wide reliance on entrepreneurial behavior that purposefully and continuously 
rejuvenates the organization and shapes the scope of its operations through the recognition 
and exploitation of entrepreneurial opportunity”. According to this definition, purpose, 
continuity and entrepreneurial opportunities are the most relevant characteristics of 
entrepreneurial strategy separating it from other types of corporate strategies. Sonfield and 
Lussier (1997) emphasize innovativeness in addition to the risk taking when estimating how 
entrepreneurial a strategy is. Also Kuratko and Audretsch (2009) note that entrepreneurial 
strategies may include taking a higher level of risk when discovering unique opportunities 
instead of following an obvious direction.  
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Strategy for entrepreneurship is needed in order to enhance and systematize entrepreneurial 
activities in corporations. It also includes a decision of the entrepreneurial level the company 
is aiming to achieve. (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009.) Strategy for entrepreneurship defines 
what the areas where entrepreneurial activity is desired are. It also defines the emphasis on 
generating new businesses versus renewing the existing business. In addition, it may include 
the innovativeness expectations on the business units and management levels of the 
corporation, such as goal setting and follow-up of entrepreneurial activities. (Morris et al., 
2008.) 
 
2.4 Corporate entrepreneurship and startups 
 
Startups are covered and mentioned in few corporate entrepreneurship studies. Kohler (2016) 
examines corporate accelerators as one form of corporate venturing. His study is situated 
between the corporate entrepreneurship, startup-corporate collaboration and partnerships and 
open innovation literature. (Kohler, 2016.) Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015) use the 
perspective of innovation to see how technology corporations reach for entrepreneurial 
capabilities through different forms of startup engagement. 
 
The literature of corporate entrepreneurship does not in general define the new business 
outcomes of corporate entrepreneurship. The literature mostly refers to them as new 
businesses and spin-offs, but does not define their nature or call them for instance startups. 
(Covin & Kuratko, 2010; Dess et al., 2003.)  
 
Kohler (2016, 349) introduces the concept of corporate-startup engagement spectrum (Figure 
4), with the help of which he describes different ways of conducting corporate-startup 
engagement. In his spectrum only five ways are described: hackathons, incubators, 
incubation, venturing and M&A. However, in his article also four additional ways, 
accelerators, pilot projects, customership and distribution, are introduced although they are 
not included in the spectrum. (Kohler, 2016.) Therefore, I present all the nine ways in the 
same corporate-startup engagement spectrum. Furthermore, I describe the four models for 
corporate-startup engagement of Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015), which are illustrated in 
Figure 5. 
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Figure 4 Corporate-startup engagement spectrum (after Kohler, 2016) 
 
 
 
Figure 5 Four models of corporate-startup engagement (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015) 
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Kohler (2016) mentions corporate hackathons as an unsubstantial short-term corporate-
startup engagement, but does not elaborate it further. Business incubators are a corporate-
startup engagement form which does not continuously demand participation and resources 
from the corporation. Business incubator is described as a working space for startups which is 
supported by a corporation and which provides services directed for startups. The selection of 
the business incubator participants is however conducted by the corporation. (Kohler, 2016.)  
 
Corporate incubation denotes how to take advantage of innovations inside a corporation that 
are not seen essential for the company. Corporate incubation is not considered to be as 
powerful innovation tool as for instance corporate accelerators. The connection of startups 
and corporate incubation is not described further, but it may be assumed that corporate 
incubation as startup engagement is for example taking spin-offs of the employees of the 
corporation into account. (Kohler, 2016.) Also Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015) recognize the 
corporate incubation startup engagement model as a traditional model of startup engagement. 
It is a way of exploiting internal innovations which cannot be exploited in the own 
organization due to the current business focus. These internal innovations can be financially 
exploited and commercialized through corporate incubation. (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015.) 
 
Kohler (2016) understands corporate venturing to be a financial technique in startup 
engagement compared to the broad sense of corporate venturing as the sub-concept of 
corporate entrepreneurship (Covin & Kuratko, 2010). Corporate venturing is not a 
systematized way of startup engagement and thus it may be hard to enable simultaneous 
engagement with many startups through corporate venturing. (Kohler, 2016.) Weiblen and 
Chesbrough (2015) list corporate venture capital as a traditional corporate-startup engagement 
model. Corporate venturing means financing such an entrepreneurial activity which is 
regarded as interesting in terms of new technologies or markets. In corporate venturing there 
is a potential of financial profit but the primary reason is to explore new interesting topics 
corporations would otherwise not have access to and to buy influence in them. Venturing may 
lead to acquisitions, if the startup is regarded interesting enough. (Weiblen & Chesbrough, 
2015.) 
 
Mergers and acquisitions provide a fast tool for business entries and specific business 
problems (Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson & Ireland, 2001). Also according to Vesper (1990), 
startups offer corporations a possible way for executing a business entry. The advantage of 
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mergers and acquisitions is that they offer possibilities for piloting with many startups and to 
gain a broad understanding of the available potential target startups. Acquiring startups after 
corporation accelerator programs remarkably fastens the process of exploring the available 
potential startups, since the interesting startups are already reviewed during the program. 
(Kohler, 2016.) 
 
Corporate accelerators are programs in a limited timeframe and the participant startups are 
generally searched through an open application process. Corporations effectively meet 
potential partners and startups are provided with mentoring and resources. Investments made 
in corporate accelerators are not primarily made in terms of financial value, but to gain insight 
and access to new technologies, markets and capabilities. Corporate accelerators are partly 
developed from business incubators which corporations have operated earlier. (Kohler, 2016.) 
Corporate accelerators are similar to the new corporate-engagement model of outside-in 
startup programs. In these programs, startups are suppliers of new technologies and ideas. 
Outside-in startup programs are designed to enable corporations a possibility to screen and 
explore ideas of multiple startups in a systematized but yet light administrative structure. The 
exploration is thorough since it is conducted in the framework of the program. Outside-in 
startup programs also tighten the gap between the startup and corporate world. (Weiblen & 
Chesbrough, 2015.)  
 
New product development, market opportunity exploration and new technology development 
are reasons for corporate-startup pilot projects. Pilot projects include funding, and from the 
perspective of the corporations the core of these projects is to innovate externally at a lower 
cost. Corporations may use startups as their suppliers and thus be customers of startups. This 
is especially possible after an accelerator program where corporations have had the chance to 
explore potential startups. Furthermore, partnering in distribution is also noted as a way of 
corporate-startup engagement. When distributing the solution of startups, corporations have 
recognized a valuable joint solution. (Kohler, 2016.) 
 
Furthermore, Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015) discuss inside-out platform startup programs 
as a new model for corporate-startup engagement. In these programs, corporates supply their 
technology and capabilities for startups, which in turn develop new products for the purposes 
of corporations. The aim of inside-out platform startup programs is to expand the current 
markets of corporations. The inside-out platform startup programs are carefully designed and 
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structured, but may not be as limited in time as outside-in programs. Platforms may be used in 
a more long-term manner in order to lure startups to the ecosystem of the firm. The platform 
model is stated to be the dominant current innovation model of corporations. (Weiblen & 
Chesbrough, 2015.) 
 
There are limitations regarding the presented engagement models and forms. Weiblen and 
Chesbrough (2015) note that their models are not mutually exclusive and corporations may 
therefore exploit several of them simultaneously. Also the industry context is limited: 
Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015) represent their corporate-startup engagement models only in 
the context of technology corporations and Kohler (2016) too has studied only technology 
companies. 
 
According to Kohler (2016), the corporate accelerators act as the interface between startups 
and corporations and one of their greatest advantages is to bring these two parties closer to 
each other. The two-way function of corporate accelerators is to produce value for the 
participating startups and to generate innovation benefits for the corporation organizing the 
accelerator program (Kohler, 2016.). The same notion of bringing the two completely 
different environments closer to each other is also stated by Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015) 
and therefore the notion appears not to be interrelated only to accelerators. 
 
2.5 Theoretical framework 
 
As noted, the concept of corporate entrepreneurship and its terminology is partly elusive and 
overlapping. It is also evolving, as is seen for example in the four types of corporate 
entrepreneurship (Covin & Miles, 1999; Dess et al., 2003), which have turned into five types 
of strategic entrepreneurship (Covin & Kuratko, 2010; Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009). 
 
Based on the theoretical discussions, I employ a theoretical framework of two models to this 
study. The first model sums up the reasons or purposes the literature suggests for conducting 
corporate entrepreneurship. The second model sums up the forms of engaging in corporation 
entrepreneurship according to earlier studies. I do not separate corporate venturing and 
strategic entrepreneurship in these frameworks but regard the concept of corporate 
entrepreneurship as one entirety. I chose to create and combine the framework myself and not 
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use an existing framework, since there are no generally accepted, extensive models on the 
purposes and forms of corporate entrepreneurship. 
 
2.5.1 Purposes of corporate entrepreneurship 
 
The first model of my theoretical framework is a recapitulation of the purposes the earlier 
literature suggests for corporate entrepreneurship. I have divided them into four levels: (1) the 
fundamental purpose, (2) pursued main capabilities, (3) concrete purposes and (4) practical 
purposes. The levels describe how abstract or concrete the purposes are. The model is 
naturally a compact simplification of the earlier literature. I have selected the main themes 
that arise in the previous literature, and thus the model is not exhaustive. It may also be 
justified to argue a different order of the purposes, since the purposes may be understood in 
varied senses and they may also be interconnected with each other. The model of the purposes 
of corporate entrepreneurship is illustrated in Figure 6. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6 Theoretical framework (1/2) of this study: Purposes of corporate entrepreneurship 
 
The fundamental purpose of surviving in a changing and competitive business environment is 
found in many previous studies and it seems to be the justifying foundation to corporate 
entrepreneurship research (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990; Ireland et al., 2009; Kuratko & 
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Audretsch, 2009; Morris et al., 2008; Peltola, 2012). The fundamental purpose is very abstract 
and general. I do not define a changing and competitive business environment, since it may be 
a subjective understanding of each company. 
 
The slightly more concrete level is the level describing the main capabilities companies 
pursue with corporate entrepreneurship. The capabilities are renewal, innovativeness and 
generating new businesses, since they enable the fundamental main purpose but they are no 
concrete, defined actions. Innovativeness is an evident pursued capability according to many 
corporate entrepreneurship studies (Covin & Kuratko, 2010; Covin & Miles, 1999; Kohler, 
2016; Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). Renewal here means the capabilities needed for 
organizational transformation (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990) and all of the forms of strategic 
entrepreneurship which eventually pursue renewal (Covin & Kuratko, 2010; Covin & Miles, 
1999; Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009). Generating new businesses refers to the essential part of 
corporate entrepreneurship of exploring new business areas, producing new businesses and 
realizing growth (Miles & Covin, 2002; Stevenson & Jarillo, 1990). 
 
The concrete purposes are business model reconstruction, new strategic direction, 
organizational transformation and domain redefinition, mainly according to four of the five 
areas of strategic entrepreneurship. I have not chosen the fifth area of strategic management, 
sustained regeneration, separately in this model. (Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009.) In my mind, 
the core of sustained regeneration is already included in renewal and innovativeness on the 
upper level of the model. The concrete purposes are selected since they represent concrete, 
realizable actions. 
 
The practical purposes of the model are risk taking ability, resource allocation, opportunity 
seeking and speed and focus in operations. These are selected since they describe the practical 
entrepreneurial skills or capabilities corporations pursue in their corporate entrepreneurship 
engagement. (Kohler, 2016; Phan et al., 2009; Sonfield & Lussier, 1997; Stevenson & Jarillo, 
1990; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015.) 
 
The core of this model is not only to itemize the different purposes. The core observation is 
that there are purposes on varied levels and the different levels cannot be compared with each 
other. The more particular purposes also concretize the very abstract and general purposes of 
the two highest levels. 
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2.5.2 Forms of corporate entrepreneurship 
 
The second model in my theoretical framework is a recapitulation of the forms of how the 
corporations engage in corporate entrepreneurship. Also this model is divided into levels 
according to how concrete or abstract the forms are. The forms are gathered from earlier 
literature and categorized into three levels: (1) conceptual forms, (2) structured models and 
(3) concrete means. This model too is a compact simplification of earlier literature. I have 
selected the main themes that arise in previous literature, and thus neither this model is 
exhaustive. It may also be justified to argue a different order of the listed forms, since some of 
the forms may be understood in varied senses and they may also be interconnected with each 
other. The model is illustrated in Figure 7. 
 
 
 
Figure 7 Theoretical framework (2/2) of this study: Forms of corporate entrepreneurship 
 
The conceptual forms represent the concepts of executing entrepreneurial activities. Corporate 
incubation, entrepreneurial strategies and corporate venturing are the most evident, abstract 
concepts of corporate entrepreneurship arising from the previous literature (Covin & Kuratko, 
2010; Guth and Ginsberg, 1990; Kuratko & Audretsch, 2009; Morris et al., 2008). The 
structured models are corporate accelerators, inside-out platform startup programs, outside-in 
startup programs and corporate incubators. According to previous literature, these models are 
structured, systematic and in advance designed approaches for executing corporate 
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entrepreneurship. (Kohler, 2016; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015.) The concrete means are a 
summary of the concrete ways mentioned in the previous literature of corporate 
entrepreneurship. The means are piloting, customership, investments, spin-offs, organizational 
structure, outsourcing, distribution, M&A, hackathons, licensing and joint ventures. 
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3 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
 
In this chapter I comprehensively report the methodological choices I have made during this 
study and present the research process and the research subject. I also describe the quality of 
the collected materials and their main features. Lastly, I describe how I have conducted the 
content analysis on the empirical materials.  I detail the research methodology carefully since 
it enhances the reliability of the research (Hirsjärvi, Remes & Sajavaara, 2013, 232). 
 
3.1 Research process 
 
The research process described here is illustrated in Figure 8. I started the process by 
discovering the research phenomenon and topic in general both empirically and theoretically, 
attending the thesis seminar and searching for a suitable organization to commission a 
master’s thesis assignment from me. I wanted to conduct my master’s thesis as an assignment 
in order to produce as relevant and useful knowledge as possible and in order to get 
professional practitioner insight into my research topic. The negotiations concluded with an 
assignment from a professional services company PwC and close co-operation with 
Confederation of Finnish Industries (Elinkeinoelämän keskusliitto, EK). I was appointed an 
adviser from both organizations, Lauri Lehtovuori (PwC) and Outi Ervasti (Confederation of 
Finnish Industries), who guided and aided me especially in the empirical matters throughout 
the research process. These contacts were also important for the study in order to get access to 
the top management of the established companies and to be able to conduct elite interviews 
(Koskinen, Alasuutari & Peltonen, 2005, 112-115).  
 
 37 
 
 
Figure 8 Illustration of the research process 
 
I continued the research process by outlining the research topic and familiarizing myself 
further with both the empirical and theoretical background of the phenomenon. After this I 
was ready to define the preliminary research questions with the help of my academic 
supervisor, peer team and instructors from PwC and Confederation of Finnish Industries. 
Simultaneously I mapped, selected and contacted possible companies and interviewees for the 
interviews. I had chosen the general goal of the research, qualitative research strategy and the 
preliminary research questions before deciding the empirical materials, as Eriksson and 
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Kovalainen (2008, 77) suggest. I received feedback several times during this phase of the 
research process. 
 
As the interviews were conducted during several months, I simultaneously collected also the 
secondary data of the research. In addition, I started the analysis and interpretation process 
during the materials collection. When the analysis and interpretation of the materials 
progressed, I got a holistic understanding of the research topic and I was able to re-outline and 
re-define my research questions. I conducted this by observing the most important themes and 
findings of the empirical materials and comparing them to the previous research questions. 
 
I conducted the analysis and the theoretical framework at the same time, which is allowed for 
abductive analysis (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008). Thus, I also defined and elaborated the 
research questions during the research process. After this I was able to focus on the theoretical 
literature and framework developed earlier and to write the manuscript of this research report. 
As these tasks were accomplished, I received extensive feedback from many parties and 
partly rewrote the manuscript. I presented my master’s thesis in the seminar in September and 
made the required changes. At this point I checked from the interviewees the empirical facts 
regarding the interviewed companies and confirmed that the anonymity of the companies and 
interviewees is sufficient. Lastly, the language was revised to ensure the quality of the 
academic style of this research report. 
 
My role as the researcher is visible in many phases. In qualitative research researchers are 
always present with their own individual background, knowledge and experiences. This 
influences the research process from the selection of the topic to the prioritization and 
highlighting of the findings and conclusions. 
 
Apart from deciding and outlining the research topic, my influence as the researcher has been 
most considerable when interviewing the interviewees and when analyzing and interpreting 
the materials. In the interviews, I tried to be as neutral as possible and used leading questions 
only in order to lead the conversation to a specific theme. However, when leading the 
conversation in a precisely restricted period of time, it is highly possible that my pace of 
interviewing or my word choices have either led the interviewees to say certain issues or leave 
certain issues out. I may have particularly influenced the interviewees by associating different 
issues or themes with the concept of startup activities. Without this, the associations may not 
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have been made and the interviewees might not have touched upon the themes. When 
observing, there was no risk to influence the interviewees, since I only observed the content of 
presentations in the audience, once in a semi-public event and once in a large private event. 
 
In a qualitative analysis and interpretation, the significance and role of researchers and their 
background is unavoidable. However, I have worked systematically with the research topic 
and questions in mind and been loyal to the empirical materials. I have truly attempted to 
disseminate the information and views the empirical materials present. 
 
3.2 Research materials 
 
The main aim of my materials collection was to ensure that the study is based on diverse and 
extensive materials. Thus, I used both primary and secondary data. Diverse empirical 
materials form a plausible basis for the analysis and conclusions of this research. The term 
primary data refers to empirical materials which do not exist before the researcher collects 
them, whereas the term secondary data refers to materials which have already been collected 
by someone else and thus already exist (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008, 78). 
 
3.2.1 Primary data 
 
The primary data of this study consists of the materials produced in semi-structured 
interviews and by observing in startup events. The semi-structured interviews are clearly the 
main primary data resource, whereas both the closed questionnaire and observation produced 
complementary and background materials. 
 
Semi-structured interviews 
 
Since my epistemological starting point is subjectivism, it is reasonable to use interviews as 
the main data collection method. Interviews allow the researcher to direct the materials 
collection during the actual situation. I found this important since my research topic and its 
concepts are not yet established and therefore the terminology may be ambiguous. Interviews 
are also recommended for materials collection if the research topic is fairly little explored. 
 40 
(Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2011, 35-36.) In addition, interviews are efficient and practical when 
collecting materials that do not exist as secondary data (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008, 80-81). 
 
The semi-structured interview, also called guided interview, can be a highly efficient 
interview method due to the combination of control and direction of the researcher and the 
freedom of the interviewee. This method is appropriate for asking both what and how 
questions. (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008, 82; Hirsjärvi & Hurme, 2011, 47; Koskinen et al., 
2005, 105.) Semi-structured interview allows the interviewee to speak with their own voice 
and to express their own views, so the method is ideal for producing knowledge from the 
perspective of the interviewees (Koskinen et al., 2005, 164). I chose to use the semi-structured 
interview method since I felt it was important to allow the interviewees to express their own 
views without restrictions. Hence I could find themes associated with startup activities which 
I would not have been able to realize myself and which would not perhaps have arisen in a 
structured interview. It is typical for qualitative research to favor methods which allow the 
interviewees to express their own views and voice, such as the method of semi-structured 
interview (Hirsjärvi et al., 2013, 164). In addition, I had previous experience of the semi-
structured interview technique from my bachelor’s thesis, so I had already rehearsed the 
method, which is recommended by the method literature (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008, 82). 
Private, one-to-one interview is one of the few ways to acquire information from the upper 
management and it may be the only method allowing to acquire knowledge on the meanings 
and interpretations people have on the matter of interest (Koskinen et al., 2005, 105-106). 
 
Eleven established companies, which were known to be engaged in startup activity and 
estimated to conduct it on a wider scale, were chosen from various industries. I requested the 
companies to propose one management group member and one who is engaged in startup 
activity in practice to be interviewees for my study. Eventually, fifteen interviewees were 
reached and chosen. I interviewed them separately. The companies were intentionally chosen 
from different industries in order to ensure that the findings are not bound to some specific 
industry and in order to obtain rich data. It was one of the research interests to discover 
various industries in order to observe if startup activity occurs in various industries. The 
companies include both privately owned companies and public companies. The selection of 
the companies as research objects was appropriate and functional, and not coincidental, as 
Hirsjärvi et al. (2013; 164) guide. 
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The positions of the interviewees vary from CEO to Development Manager. Eight of the 
fifteen interviewees represent top management, considering their management group 
memberships.  Three interviewees represent upper or middle management and four represent 
lower management. The object of interviewing both top management and those who are 
practically involved in the startup activities in their everyday work is therefore succeeded. 
Interviewing two persons from four companies each is also a way to ensure triangulation. The 
interviewees represent Technology, Research & Development, Business Development and 
Communication functions and top management with business responsibility. The division of 
the organizational levels and functions of the interviewees is presented in the Table 1 and 
Table 2.  
 
Table 1 Organizational level of the interviewees 
 
Organizational level Number of interviewees 
Management group members 8 
Lower management 4  
Upper or middle management 3 
  
 
Table 2 Organizational function of the interviewees 
 
Location in the organization Number of interviewees 
Technology or R&D 6 
Business responsibility 5 
Business Development or 
Innovations 
2 
CEO 1 
Communications 1 
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Both the names of the companies and the interviewees are encrypted in order to secure the 
anonymity of the companies and people involved. For the same reason there are no details 
about the companies or interviewees separately. In this research report, I refer to the 
companies with codes and when needed, with industries.  
 
Table 3 Interviewed companies and their coding 
 
No. Company Industry Interviewee 
1 
Interviewee 
2 
1. A building 
products 
A1 A2 
2. B forest B1 B2 
3. C energy C1 C2 
4. D energy D1  
5. E pharmaceuticals E1  
6. F retail F1  
7. G recycling G1  
8. H technology H1 H2 
9. I IT services and 
solutions 
I1  
10. J electronics J1  
11. K machinery K1  
 
 
I refer to the interviewees with a combination of a letter signifying the company and a number 
signifying the interviewees, in order to help the reader to recognize when it is a person in 
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question and when a company. The anonymity of the interviewees and companies is also 
assured by blackening single critical words in the direct citations. The critical blackened 
words are industry specific terms or names. In order to ease the reading, the blackened words 
in the citations are explained in square brackets when necessary. The companies and the 
interviewees, their industries and coding are listed in Table 3.  
 
Technically, my semi-structured interviews were based on an interview guide of themes and 
open questions to ease the interview process, as suggested in the methodology literature. My 
interview guide consisted of five main themes and further defining auxiliary questions 
ensuring the fluent progress of the interview. I employed the interview guide in a flexible 
manner in order to customize and optimize the interview themes and questions depending 
both on the company in question and the themes the interviewee was telling about, which is 
allowed in semi-structured interviews. (Koskinen et al., 2005, 104-108.) Also Eriksson and 
Kovalainen (2008, 82) warn about following the interview guide too strictly and thus 
preventing interviewees from telling other significant matters. The interview guide was 
intentionally broad and not very focused. With the help of this, the interviewees could also 
say matters that I as the researcher had perhaps not even thought to be related to the main 
topic. The questions of the interview guide had to be varied and broad, since my research 
topic is not an established entity and thus different people perceive different topics of startup 
activity in different ways. The translated interview guide is found in the appendixes of this 
research report. 
 
I made two pilot interviews in order to improve and elaborate my interview guide. The themes 
and the questions of the pilot interview were almost the same as in the main interviews. 
Therefore, I have analyzed and utilized the materials of the pilot interviews as the materials of 
the other interviews. Three of the interviews were made by phone and the rest twelve face to 
face. All of the interviews were recorded. After conducting the interviews, I transcribed them 
and made a preliminary analysis as quickly as possible after the interviews. I wrote the 
transcripts in the level three according to the classification of transcription styles of Koskinen 
et al. (2005, 320), i.e. word for word. I could have easily lost the opinions and views of 
interviewees expressed by particular word choices if I had conducted the transcription with 
the compacting level two (Koskinen et al., 2005, 320). I have only left a few single words 
repeated in a row not transcribed, but in general I have transcribed also the expletives and the 
mumblings in order to secure the interpretation of views and opinions. 
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The interviews, transcript and analysis were conducted in Finnish. Only the findings of 
empirical materials are reported in English. The translation of the direct citations used in this 
research report may reduce the voice of the interviewees. In order to ease the understanding of 
the citations, I have clarified the citations by modifying sentence structures and by removing 
expletives. Taking this into account, I have translated the citations as accurately as possible. I 
therefore trust that the originality of the citations remains on an adequate level after my 
translation. 
 
Observation in the events 
 
I participated in two events on corporation-startup collaboration: “Helsinki Startup Spirit” 
aimed for both established companies and startups, organized by Helsinki Chamber of 
Commerce, and a business breakfast aimed for corporation executives, hosted by PwC. In 
these events, I observed and made notes on the presentations given on the subject. The 
speakers were senior executives representing established and mostly multinational companies. 
 
Since observation is considered as a challenging and demanding materials collection method, 
I only observed the content and substance of the presentations and speeches. Hence I could 
avoid most of the methodological challenges concerning observation, which arise for example 
when observing behavior or interaction. (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008, 87.) The materials I 
have collected through observation are complementary by nature, which legitimizes my usage 
of this challenging materials collection method. 
 
3.2.2 Secondary data 
 
The secondary data functioned both as background information in the beginning of my 
research process and as complementary information after conducting the interviews and their 
interpretation. In addition, the secondary data has also helped me interpret the primary data I 
have collected. Secondary written data is especially recommended as complementary material 
due to its efficiency and particularity (Koskinen et al., 2005, 130-133). 
 
I have selected relevant secondary data about the startup activities of the interviewed 
companies as well as other established companies in general. The secondary data is collected 
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mostly from public sources but it also includes a few documents received from the 
interviewees. 
 
Corporate communications: annual reports, press releases and home pages 
 
I have used the corporate communications as a source of public secondary data. I have 
utilized company home pages, annual reports and press releases regarding startup activity. 
The secondary data provides a public and an official view of the established companies on 
startup activities. 
 
News and reports about startup activities 
 
Startup activities of established companies is a current topic and thus well reported in the 
news and widely discussed in the local business debate. The news reports have provided me 
with useful information especially regarding the companies that I have not interviewed. 
 
There are also several national and international non-academic reports written on the topic. 
The findings of these empirical reports have given me an understanding and insight into the 
phenomenon of the established companies’ startup activities and thus helped me interpret my 
primary data. 
 
3.3 Analysis and interpretation 
 
I have chosen a qualitative content analysis as my analysis method and I have applied an 
abductive perspective to my analysis. An abductive perspective refers to deduction that 
combines empirical materials and theory as the starting point of the analysis (Tuomo & 
Sarajärvi, 2002, 99). An abductive perspective is justified because although there is some 
research on my topic, my understanding of the phenomenon differs from the viewpoints of 
other researchers.  
 
Before applying any analysis method, I started the examination by reading the collected 
materials several times and taking notes, as Koskinen et al. (2005, 231) suggest. Then I have 
followed the three-step-advice of Tuomi and Sarajärvi (2002, 109-116) to conduct a 
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qualitative content analysis: I have first broken the materials into pieces, then conceptualized 
the materials from the broken pieces and lastly reorganized the materials into new meanings 
and a new wholeness. In general, the qualitative analysis is a three-step-process, as according 
to Hirsjärvi and Hurme (2011, 145), it consists of combination, description and classification. 
 
As Hirsjärvi and Hurme (2011, 137) note, the interpretation of semi-structured interviews is 
partly speculative, since the literature also recommends analyzing intentions and latent 
content. I have analyzed both the manifest content and when possible also the latent content, 
the “hidden message”, as Tuomo and Sarajärvi (2004) suggest when conducting the analysis 
of qualitative materials. 
 
 
Figure 9 Examples on the content analysis 
 
In Figure 9, I present three examples of my analysis, two from interviews (D1, 2016; F1, 
2016) and one from a report (KPMG, 2014). When reading the raw-data several times, I 
picked up extracts of significant, interesting and recurring topics. Thereafter, I translated and 
summarized the core idea of the extract. I then grouped the collected notions, as in this 
example to favorable aspects and challenges. Lastly, I developed an abstraction of the groups 
in order to present the findings in this research report. 
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3.4 Trustworthiness 
 
The trustworthiness of a qualitative research can be evaluated through the common, classic 
criteria originated from quantitative research: reliability and validity. Even though there is 
criticism of whether the criteria is suitable for qualitative research, they may still be partly 
applied. (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008, 291-296; Tuomi & Sarajärvi, 2002.) Due to the 
deficiency of these concepts, I also estimate the trustworthiness of the study by considering 
matters related specifically to the trustworthiness of qualitative research: the methodological 
weaknesses of the research process, triangulation, credibility, dependability, and 
transferability. (Tuomi & Sarajärvi, 2002). 
 
Validity refers to how well the study represents the matters it should represent and how well 
the study answers the questions it aims to answer. Validity can be divided into internal and 
external validity. The internal validity describes the internal logic and how uncontradicted the 
study is, whereas the external validity estimates if the interpretation is extrapolated to 
irrelevant issues. (Koskinen et al., 2005, 254). The validity can be enhanced by employing 
several methods (Hirsjärvi et al., 2013, 233). Therefore, I have utilized several materials 
collection methods to ensure the validity of the materials. According to my estimation, the 
materials support the phenomena and the aims of the study well. The interviews were 
conducted and the analysis is made under the topic of startup activities. Also the 
complementary materials, such as reports and events, concern specifically the phenomenon in 
the focus of the study. Therefore, the validity of this study is quite accurate according to the 
terms of qualitative research. 
 
Reliability describes how repeatable the results of the study are, in other words how easily the 
same results can be achieved with the same research methods. The phases of deduction should 
therefore be clearly expressed and constant in order to enhance the reliability. (Hirsjärvi & 
Hurme, 2011, 186; Koskinen et al., 2005, 159; 255.) I have reported the research process 
carefully and in detail, which is one demand for the reliability of the study (Hirsjärvi et al., 
2013, 232). However, in qualitative research it is out of proportion to demand exact 
repeatability . In qualitative research, the role of the researcher is very significant and thus the 
background and individual knowledge of the researcher affect the analysis for example when 
choosing the most relevant themes and most interesting findings. 
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Triangulation can refer to applying different methodologies, methods, materials, theories or 
researchers. It ensures better validity of the study. I have applied triangulation of materials 
and triangulation of theories. I have also applied the member check, which refers to allowing 
the interviewees and other participants to check and verify if they agree on my interpretations. 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008, 293.)  In seven cases, only one person in the company was 
interviewed. This leads to a triangulation problem, since the materials the interviews produce 
are always indirect information and they therefore represent solely the view of the interviewee 
(Koskinen et al., 2005, 106-107). All the information on other business units or functions of 
the interviewed companies is represented by the interviewees. Approaches, reasons and 
attitudes towards startup activity may differ inside the organizations and therefore my 
research materials may provide a narrow description of the manifestation of the phenomenon 
inside the interviewed companies. 
 
There is also a more general triangulation problem when interviewing only the established 
companies, which in this case are only one party of the startup activities. However, the 
problem is not very significant, since my purpose is to explore the views of the established 
companies. Thus, the study represents the view of the big companies and I am well aware of 
the one-sidedness of the report. Therefore, I do not try to explain the relationship between 
established companies and startups or claim my research configuration is neutral or objective 
regarding the different parties of the startup activities. 
 
According to Hirsjärvi and Hurme (2011, 184), the quality of the study should be observed 
continuously during the research process, for instance both when collecting and analyzing 
materials. In the materials collection, it was rather easy to follow the chosen methodologies. I 
had applied the semi-structured interview method already during interviewing and the 
observation was about observing on the content of the presentations. However, since I 
conducted content analysis for the first time, it was sometimes challenging to conceive the 
differences of categorization and abstraction. As a result, it may be that sometimes parts of the 
analysis are not as systematic as they could be. 
 
Generalizability refers to theoretical generalization or transferability, but not to statistical 
generalization. (Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008; Eskola & Suoranta, 1998.) Transferability asks 
if the research results can be extrapolated and extended beyond the context of the study. The 
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research results of qualitative research may be transferable if the contexts are similar enough. 
(Eriksson & Kovalainen, 2008, 293-294; Eskola & Suoranta, 1996; Tuomi & Sarajärvi, 2002, 
136.) Thus, the ideas and findings of my study may be transferred in consideration of the 
context of similar organizations and similar startup activity. However, organizations are 
always different and the startup activities may vary greatly, and it can therefore be argued that 
the results are not always transferable to other organizations. 
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4 STARTUP ACTIVITIES OF ESTABLISHED FINNISH 
COMPANIES 
 
 
In this chapter I describe and analyze the key empirical findings of the study. Firstly, by 
mapping the discovered forms of startup activities, I preface the empirical phenomenon in 
question and thus ease the understanding of the rest of the findings. Then by listing and 
describing both the favorable and the negative aspects to startup activity I describe the reasons 
established companies have had to engage or not to engage in startup activity. The aspects 
also define the issues that established companies associate with their startup activity 
engagement. 
 
The favorable and adverse aspects describe how companies view their startup activities in 
general, but not company-specifically. The company specific findings are introduced by 
categorizing the approaches that the interviewed companies had towards startup activity. 
 
4.1 How to engage in startup activities? 
 
Forms of startup activities can roughly be divided into external and internal startup activities 
based on whether they happen inside organizations or whether they are conducted in 
collaboration with external organizations. The materials examined suggest that among the 
studied Finnish established companies, external startup activities are more common than 
internal ones. Every interviewed company had engaged in some external activity, but internal 
activities other than acquisitions are rarer. The division of internal and external startup 
activities is illustrated in Figure 10. 
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Figure 10 External and internal startup activities recognized in the interviews 
 
In reality, most forms of startup activity contain both internal and external elements. The 
internal startups can co-operate with external startups (I1, 2016), id est practice external 
startup activity. Also external projects conducted with external startups need plenty of internal 
attention, resources and ambition (B2, 2016; C1, 2016; H1, 2016). 
 
“But then in my mind large companies should be prepared - - that when the project 
begins, you can’t in any case think that this is now some carefree work. Because it’s 
surely real work and it takes people’s time. In the very same way as any other project.” 
(B2, 2016) 
 
4.1.1 External startup activity 
 
Engaging in an external startup activity means collaboration with external startups or 
activities which take place outside the own organization. External startup activities include 
various forms of collaboration from short experimental pilot projects to partnerships lasting 
several years. During the long partnerships, the partner startups may grow and turn into SME 
companies. A common way to put external startup activity into practice is to start with a small 
pilot project and continue to a partnership if the pilot is successful. (E1, 2016; J1, 2016). Own 
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accelerator programs, investments and startup screenings are also counted as external activity. 
Investments can be made either directly or for example through an industry specific fund (A1, 
2016; B1, 2016; D1, 2016). 
 
“So XXXXXX [the company] has already in 2008 partnered with this one venture 
capital fund, which is in Canada, and it invests in companies in the field of renewable 
energy” (D1, 2016) 
 
“But every now and then we have been thinking that should we participate financially; 
the other option is that we would invest in some fund. In a venture fund.” (B1, 2016) 
 
The discovered external startup activities also include subcontracting, competitions, 
hackathons and startup event participation. (A1, 2016; B1, 2016; B2, 2016; C2, 2016; D1, 
2016; E1, 2016; J1, 2016; K1, 2016). The external startup activity is in most cases meant to 
produce new ideas for current and prospective products and services. 
 
“We didn’t have money to offer and we weren’t there [in the event] in an investor role. 
We were just looking around what the trends are, what people are talking about and 
what kind of know-how and products are on their way.” (C2, 2016) 
 
Some external startup activities, such as small experimental collaboration projects or 
hackathons, do not require plenty of resources, since they are only short-term temporary 
activities. These kinds of projects can be very small and therefore they are found to be easy 
activities to begin with. (D1, 2016; G1, 2016; J1, 2016; K1, 2016). 
 
“Normally it goes so that first we try something and start off with as small a project as 
possible. In order to see how it’s working, how personal chemistry is working, and what 
the result of the cooperation is. And well, if it looks promising, then we extend the scope 
and take the next project.” (J1, 2016) 
 
“What we have discovered is that in these meetings [with startups] and so on, you can’t 
get a clear understanding. So the easiest way is to do a small pilot together. When you 
on the one hand see what the startup can do, which are their abilities, and on the other 
hand you see if it’s working with us. So that’s perhaps efficient. To do something small 
together.” (D1, 2016) 
 
Some external startup activities, such as collaboration or accelerator programs, can be 
coordinated by a third party. The third party may for example be a specialized boutique 
consulting company or another established company. (A2, 2016; D1, 2016; F1, 2016). 
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“And then we have here during the past months, through a couple of examples, started 
discussions with one potential partner. About building us a specific accelerator 
program.” (A2, 2016) 
 
4.1.2 Internal startup activity 
 
Internal startup activity refers to those activities which take place inside the organization of an 
established company and which are conducted with their own resources. The most evident 
form of internal startup activity are internal startups. Internal startups are growth businesses 
which are administratively located inside an established company (D1, 2016; I1, 2016). 
 
“Then another side is these internal startups. In 2014 we tried this internal startup 
model for the first time.” (D1, 2016) 
 
“We too have growth businesses and at the moment we also call three of them startups. 
- - And, well, these are separate startups, growth businesses, which are here next to the 
parent company, but hundred percent owned by us.” (I1, 2016) 
 
The internal startups are in many ways rather independent units following looser rules 
compared to the main organization. They are given reliefs for example of the company wide 
reporting rules, short-term profit expectations and code of recruiting (B1, 2016; D1, 2016; I1, 
2016). According to D1 (2016), internal startups are initiatives for growth businesses. Also I1 
(2016) describes, that Company I’s internal startups have to have the turnover potential of 
hundreds of millions euros. These notions suggest that internal startups are mostly used for 
seeking fast growth. 
 
“No, we are not talking about something like hundreds of thousands of euros or a 
couple of millions, we are talking about hundreds of millions.” (I1, 2016) 
 
Established companies can also themselves act as startups without having official and 
structural internal startups. According to B1 (2016), Company B has no actual and official 
internal startups but the operations of their venturing unit exploring new growth businesses 
are very similar to the operations of internal startups. The new businesses in the venturing unit 
have reliefs of the company wide processes, reporting rules and short-term profit 
expectations, just as the internal startups. (B1, 2016.) This suggests that the established 
companies may conduct more extensive and diverse startup activity than they express or 
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perceive themselves. Venturing can also be seen as startup activity through the perspective 
that established companies are acting as startups when venturing. 
 
Startup acquisitions are a borderline case in the external-internal division. They can be seen as 
external startup activity first when screening and acquiring an external organization which 
then transforms into internal activity when the acquisition is completed. However, the post-
merger practices differ among the interviewed companies. Due to the different post-merger 
practices, the influence the acquired startups have on the organization of the acquiring parent 
company differ. (A1, 2016; A2, 2016; H1, 2016; H2, 2016; J1, 2016.) 
 
“Well, it [the acquired startup] continues with its own brand. And integration, well, it 
hasn’t been that deeply integrated. So of course we aim to take over some 
administrative tasks over the years. That they are able to focus on their own specialty.” 
(J1, 2016) 
 
“Case by case, it’s linked to, and above all it depends on how mature the business is. 
And why is the purchase done. So it’s case by case.” (I1, 2016) 
 
“But then in digitalization, if you buy these companies, they are based on quite agile 
operations - - . So if we throw them here tightly close to us, they end up in a little too 
tight squeeze. So that’s what I’ve been thinking a lot.” (C1, 2016) 
 
 
The motive for potential acquisitions is not only the appreciation. When acquiring companies, 
established companies are mainly searching for other benefits, such as sight and access to new 
technologies.  
 
“But there are no clear guidelines. That we would be interested in the startup field in 
that sense that we would buy some targets. Which would go for appreciation and then at 
some point we would do an exit, not that kind of things. Rather, we have guidelines that 
those solutions which are linked to our business and could serve it, we are more 
interested in those solutions. Than in the appreciation of the startup.” (F1, 2016) 
 
 
4.1.3 Time span of startup activities  
 
The length of the startup activities varies among the interviewed companies and also inside 
the organizations depending on which kind of project is in question. The startup activity as a 
company-wide operation, for example general collaboration with external startups, is seen as 
continuous in the long term (A1, 2016; B1, 2016; D1, 2016; E1, 2016; F1, 2016). Single 
 55 
collaboration projects may be only a few week long pilot projects (D1, 2016; J1, 2016) or the 
collaboration may last several years as a partnership (A1, 2016; A2, 2016; E1, 2016; F1, 
2016; KPMG, 2015, 12). 
 
”Well, it can naturally be, if we talk about these startup firms. If it’s a service firm and 
you need it every now and then, and if the need remains, so then the collaboration can 
last for a very long time.” (E1, 2016) 
 
“So it was the first concrete example, we worked on that the whole year. And now we 
are thinking with thestartup [the startup] how to go on with our collaboration.” (G1, 
2016) 
 
According to J1 (2016), established companies may not even participate in minor pilot 
projects. Thus, startups may occasionally be the only realistic and available partners for short 
experiments of established companies. According to H1 (2016), smaller companies such as 
startups offer rather suitable circumstances for a continuous partnership. 
 
“And well, when it comes to the continuity with the smaller ones, we have been  a 
significant buyer for them. So that they have developed their solutions together with us. 
And not just like made one service. If we buy from a huge player, they will do one thing 
and that’s it, the person [in the huge player] can continue doing something else. But 
with these smaller ones, it’s more about partnership. And that’s the big difference - -.“ 
(H1, 2016)  
 
Also B2 describes how Company B is looking for continuous partnerships with startups: 
 
“You can see it so that we have now during the past six months made very close co-
operation with one growth company. And before that we made an interview round in the 
autumn 2015. We were looking for one great partner, one startup, with whom we could  
think about more long-term development.” (B2, 2016) 
 
 
4.1.4 Partners among others versus a special role 
 
A contradictory aspect on startup activity is how startups are considered as collaboration 
parties. Established companies may regard startups as partners among others or they may 
consider startups to have a special role among their partners. The special role does not 
necessarily stand for higher importance. It rather means that the established companies have 
recognized that the most suitable solutions for co-operating with startups differ from co-
operating with other partners. When regarded as special partners, the special characteristics 
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and needs of startups are taken into consideration in the co-operation. The special role is 
recognized most distinctively among companies of the later presented category of strategic 
exploiters (D1, 2016; F1,2016; I1, 2016). 
 
When startups are considered to be partners among others, they mostly meet the same 
requirements as other partners. There are no or very few special arrangements for startup 
activity in comparison with collaboration with other companies. Thus, the co-operation is not 
necessarily adjusted for the special characteristics of startups. (J1, 2016; K1, 2016.) 
 
“So regarding a couple of firms we have also been looking at the financial situation and 
went through those reports and took our procurement also with us. And then there are 
these company backgrounds and so on. We want that continuity, continuity is what we 
want, it’s our criterion.” (K1, 2016) 
 
However, there might be special arrangements for startup activity in order to enhance the 
collaboration, but even then established companies are not specifically searching certain 
solutions among startups or the fact that a solution provider is a startup does not affect the 
decision. 
 
“Of course we have [special arrangements]. We collaborate with startups in a much 
earlier stage than with other companies. We don’t do commercialization and the 
development stage with startups like with other companies.” (E1, 2016) 
 
“It can be anything, it can be a larger company, - - it can be a startup company, if it 
can offer the know-how to the collaboration so that we can build added value from it.” 
(E1, 2016)  
 
It is notable that not all companies regard startups either as partners among others or special 
partners. If the established companies find the startups mostly inadequate for their aims, the 
startups are mostly not regarded as potential or suitable partners for one reason or another. 
(K1, 2016.) 
 
4.2 Favorable aspects 
 
I have identified five favorable aspects that the established companies represent on startup 
activity based on my empirical materials. The favorable aspects describe the reasons why the 
companies engage in startup activity. The reasons are varied and differ from a company to 
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another. The versatility of the aspects and experienced advantages describe the variety in 
which established companies view their startup activities. In addition, the aspects describe 
which topics the established companies associate their startup activities with and in which 
parts of their business they exploit them. The five aspects are: (1) keeping up with the changes 
of business environment, (2) developing the business, (3) developing the organization, (4) 
repute advantages and (5) social responsibility. The favorable aspects are listed briefly in 
Table 4 and described thoroughly in their own subchapters. 
 
Table 4 Favorable aspects on startup activity  
 
No. Aspect to startup activity Description 
1 Keeping up with the changes of 
business environment 
Link to the present and 
future progress. 
2 Developing the business New ideas, renewal, 
growth and strategy 
execution. 
3 Developing the organization Change in the modus 
operandi and 
enthusiasm. 
4 Repute advantages Brand and image. 
5 Social responsibility Supporting small 
companies as a major 
player of own industry. 
 
 
The reported aspects are not company-specific. Characteristics of the aspects are found in 
several interviewed companies. The aspects are also not exclusionary: several aspects are 
occurring simultaneously, in parallel and overlapping in the same companies. Some of the 
aspects are perceived in advance and have been important in the decision making of whether 
to begin startup activities. Furthermore, there are advantages which are recognized only 
during and after the startup activity execution. These advantages can turn into reasons why to 
continue and extend the startup activities of the company. 
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4.2.1 Keeping up with the changes of business environment 
 
Changes in the operational environment cause pressure for established companies. Established 
companies find that technological solutions outside their core competence and the new ways 
of operating business are progressing very quickly. Particularly digitalization and digital 
solutions are felt to progress so quickly that the internal know-how and traditional ways of 
practicing collaboration are no longer considered to be sufficient: the supply for the new 
knowledge and ways of operating are thought to be found among startups. Startup activity is 
regarded as one concrete way of keeping up with the changes of the business environment and 
following what is happening in it. This is the aspect which is most easily found both in earlier 
empirical publications and among the interviewed companies. (A1, 2016; A2, 2016; Bonzom 
& Netessine, 2016; B1, 2016; B2, 2016; H1, 2016; KPMG, 2014; KPMG, 2015; K1, 2016.) 
 
”It has no other impact for our current business than this kind of, psychological small 
impact. So that we can say to ourselves and others that we are looking around us a 
little, as if, to the other side of the past.” (A2, 2016) 
 
“It surely keeps one awake.” (J1, 2016) 
 
”There’s lots of knowledge and fresh thoughts outside. And you can’t change the world 
from within our own company and home street.” (C2, 2016) 
 
”They bring to this selfsame zoo of dinosaurs that kind of reminding, that the world 
takes a different pace somewhere else, which is always a good reminder.” (A1, 2016) 
 
The know-how of startups is associated with novel and even futurist business solutions. 
Hence, startup activity can be seen as a way of learning about the future of the industry and 
business environment. Additionally, startup activity can provide glimpses of other industries 
and their technological development, particularly of the digital solutions (B2, 2016; F1, 2016; 
H1, 2016; H2, 2016). 
 
“Maybe one could say that at the moment also the operational environment is 
challenging us. The retail business, - - but amongst other things the digitalization. 
Things there are progressing with an enormous speed. There is new technology which 
transforms the consumer behavior and business models. And so that we could be awake 
there and in the first place be part of the competition, we have to have this kind of 
innovation activity and collaboration with startups. They are absolutely critical.” (F1, 
2016) 
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Especially companies that regard their industry as old-fashioned consider startup activity to be 
a certain kind of link to the present and future, a way to keep up with the fast technological 
and operational changes. 
 
“And well, I feel that we also have to always understand where the world is going and 
what our clients are doing. What they want, what they need.” (A1, 2016) 
 
It is noteworthy to observe that these companies do not consider their own industry to be yet 
changing fast but the wider business environment around them. The companies regarding 
their industry as old-fashioned also find old-fashionedness to be one reason of why not to 
conduct more startup activity (A1, 2016; H1, 2016). 
 
“Well I think that’s one thing, that we don’t perhaps have here in Outotec [the 
company] this culture. And we don’t have this culture in the whole industry, where 
startups would be taken seriously. They are not even recognized. Or perhaps they don’t 
come to our industry, perhaps they rather go to another industry.” (C2, 2016) 
 
However, Company D makes an exception to the companies of the traditional industries. It 
regards their industry as very traditional, but it is still practicing extensive startup activity and 
transforming their business through startup activity engagement. (D1, 2016.) 
 
“The understanding that this change must happen. That our whole industry is changing 
and that the future is notably more uncertain. And in a way we have to find new 
outriggers for our businesses” (D1, 2016) 
 
According to this aspect, startup activity is seen as a solution for monitoring the latest 
progress of the own industry and the latest solutions other industries can provide to one’s own 
business. The monitored progress can be both technological or service of its nature. (A1, 
2016; A2, 2016; D1, 2016; E1, 2016; F1, 2016.) 
 
“Well, it’s more about that there is a need to find something new, a need to do things in 
a different way. And this startup co-operation is such a natural way to do it.” (D1, 
2016) 
 
The more active view of exploiting the novel ideas and solutions of startups than only keeping 
up with the changes of the business environment is to seek business renewal (A1, 2016; A2, 
2016; B1, 2016; B2, 2016; C1, 2016). This aspect is described more precisely in the following 
aspect of developing the business through startup activity. 
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4.2.2 Developing the business 
 
Established companies engage in startup activities in order to seek and generate growth and 
renew their old business. Growth and renewal are pursued both through renewing the own 
organization and through generating new businesses. 
 
“But the need came from how we can faster boost these kinds of selected growth 
business areas. Where we see a good potential, but which will drown if we put them 
elsewhere inside this concern.” (I1, 2016) 
 
Startup activities are also used for producing external novel and disruptive ideas (A1, 2016; 
B1, 2016; H1, 2016). 
 
 “There are not often these enormous genius ideas which are completely disruptive. 
Those have happened too, but there could be more of them. It is sometimes better to take 
your checkbook and go shopping and searching for something exciting.” (A1, 2016) 
 
Other aspects to startup activity are also ultimately business-driven, but this aspect concerns 
most clearly direct business benefits. For instance, many companies are developing or have 
developed completely new types of services with the help of startups and thus advanced their 
business in a strong linkage with startup activities (B1, 2016; B2, 2016; D1, 2016; E1, 2016; 
F1, 2016; G, 2016; I1, 2016). 
 
“Our purpose behind the startup activity is to improve our competitiveness. So there is 
always a commercial business thought behind it.” (G1, 2016) 
 
Startup activity as a tool for developing business is viewed either as a part of Research & 
Development, Technology or Business Development function depending on the company. 
Startup activity engagement can also be business unit based, as is the case for Company B 
(B1, 2016). Startup activity can naturally be and often is practiced in several functions or 
business units (B1, 2016; B2, 2016; D1, 2016). However, many interviewees report that their 
startup activities are or have been strongly dependent on single individuals of the 
organization. 
 
“Basically everything appears through me. So that I direct. But then I’m not necessarily 
the person in charge in every project. But still, I’m always involved, in one way or 
another, and in most cases quite a lot.” (G1, 2016) 
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Some companies are using startup activity specifically in their strategy execution. The 
representatives of Companies D, F and I consider the linkage between their startup activity 
and strategy direct and obvious. (D1, 2016; F1, 2016; I1, 2016.) The startup activities can also 
be interconnected with the strategy through strategic projects or programs, such as 
digitalization programs. In the companies that exploit startups through these kinds of projects, 
the startup activity itself is not considered as strategic, but the startup activity is regarded as a 
resource for the strategic program. (B1, 2016; H1, 2016; H2, 2016.) 
 
Startup activity as a way of developing the business can be seen in an even wider perspective. 
Some companies experience that the startup activity of established companies can promote 
and develop the whole industry. In turn, the renewal, vitality and growth of the own industry 
are also found to promote the business of the own company in the long term. (B1, 2016; C1, 
2016; E1, 2016; F1, 2016; H2, 2016). 
 
According to this aspect, it is recognized that startup activity has direct business impacts and 
benefits. However, this aspect does not assume that the business impact of startup activity is 
wide or even notable. The aspect only interconnects the startup activity clearly and directly to 
the current and future business. B2 (2016) describes how essential the direct business impact 
is: 
“When you have very strong business goals like our project had. With the help of them 
you can justify the usefulness [of startup activity]. And the goals were thought already 
in the beginning. It pays off to think, even if it was just a tiny thing. So it pays off to keep 
in mind all the time, specifically in a big company, how you are going to take it to the 
business. And how it supports our development and how we are going to get the 
results.” (B2, 2016) 
 
4.2.3 Developing the organization 
 
Startups are considered to be fast, agile and lean actors that are able to focus very intensively 
on certain issues. One of the main reasons for startup activity of established companies is to 
develop their organization towards this direction. 
 
“These more agile operations models and speed and agility and so on. The internal 
startups are also these kind of role models. And in my mind, there have been really 
good lessons and findings which we are now using also when developing our mature 
businesses and driving them forward.” (I1, 2016) 
 
 62 
Most of the companies discuss cultural change as one reason for their startup activities. 
However, the change also seems to be about change in the modus operandi and customs, not 
only in the culture and people. Thus, this aspect of developing the organization can be divided 
into an operations-oriented view and a more culture and organization-oriented view. This 
aspect is more human-centric than the previous aspect of developing business, since it 
emphasizes the import of learning, culture and customs, which are all practiced by individuals 
in the organization. According to this aspect, the business benefits will be reached through 
developing the organization and operations which in turn leads to business benefits. 
 
”- - so the startup is able, if we spot an error or some improvement need to the solution, 
they do it during the same day or even during the same hour. They can fix things on the 
run.” (F1, 2016) 
 
According to the operations-oriented view, the companies desire their operations to be faster, 
lighter, leaner and more focused. This is reached through transforming the customs of the 
organization, and the source of this change are startups and their mode of operations. The 
main aim is therefore not in the culture but in the desired operations. The culture change has 
instrumental value which leads to the desired modus operandi. Established companies may 
even purchase coaching and training from startups, for example on lean designing 
methodologies. (I1, 2016; J1, 2016.)  
 
 “And that’s where it all basically started, that we can bring agility to our own work. So 
we were looking for how to do things in a different way and faster.” (D1, 2016) 
 
Even if the need for faster operations is recognized, the established companies are not 
planning to finish their traditional ways of operating. The established companies do not desire 
to transform their entire company into a fast, agile and lean organization. Some of the 
established companies recognize that the traditional way of operating business is still the most 
suitable for many of their purposes. This also applies to the collaboration partners: startups are 
not replacing the old partners, but rather forming a new group with certain advantages. (A1, 
2016; F1, 2016; I1, 2016.) 
 
“Well, you need both. We drive forward with a steam engine but then we are constantly 
coming up with those faster vehicles and by combining these I believe we will reach the 
best outcome.”  (A1, 2016) 
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“- - well this traditional development model, in quotation marks. That the product 
development department takes the development responsibility of a product. And when 
the product is mature enough it’s transferred to the sales department. When you have 
sold those a couple of pieces the delivery team starts to deliver them. That’s the 
traditional model and it’s always an alternative. We are continuously developing our 
own mature products with this process.” (I1, 2016) 
 
Positive effects on the organization, culture, and modus operandi are already reported. The 
startup activity is found to improve the spirit of the organization and to infect the people 
involved in it with enthusiasm. For instance, Companies A, B, F, G, I and J describe the 
energizing and inspiring effect of startup activity. (A2, 2016; B1, 2016; B2, 2016; F1, 2016; 
G1, 2016; I1, 2016; J1, 2016.) According to F1 (2016), startup activities have also improved 
the internal cross-functional and cross-business collaboration inside the company. The 
inspirational and spirit-raising effect of startups is also found in the reports of KPMG (2014) 
and Confederation of Finnish Industries (2014). 
 
“In my opinion it has had a great effect especially on the mentality of the North 
American organization. Because we have been able, and Americans are so good at it, to 
say that well look, we participate in this and we want to find new things. And perhaps 
then people inside our company get some strength and a confidence boost that this 
reaching for new innovations is not just talk.” (A2, 2016) 
 
“It [startup collaboration] creates that kind of positive. And working with these startup 
companies is very energizing.” (B1, 2016) 
 
“Then you get enthusiasm from startups. They are not that stuck in their own things 
than most companies. And the eagerness spreads also to the rest of the team.” (B2, 
2016) 
  
Developing the organization can also mean adopting operations models directly from startups. 
 
“- - we have developed here inside our organization, actually from the startup world, a 
certain copied concept. To our innovation operations. We talk about these boot camps.” 
(B1, 2016) 
 
In addition, startup activity can also be a driver for structural organizational changes. 
According to D1 (2016), I1 (2016) and F1 (2016), organizational changes have been made in 
Companies D, I and F in order to promote startup activities. Also KPMG (2015, 3) notes that 
specific innovation teams are beneficial for external startup activities, since they often 
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facilitate the contacting done by startups. This may encourage for organizational changes in 
order to foster startup activity engagement. 
 
These findings suggest that startup activities of established companies are employed in 
developing the organizations in terms of culture, practices and modus operandi, spirit and 
organizational structure. There is already evidence on positively experienced effects, 
particularly in the fields of new practices, spirit and organizational structure. The aim of 
developing the organization and the modus operandi through startup activity engagement is 
also emphasized in empirical reports (INSEAD, 2016; KPMG, 2014; KPMG, 2015; Nesta, 
2015). However, the reports do not itemize the various ways of organizational development. 
 
4.2.4 Repute advantages 
 
Startup activity is considered to improve the company brand and image. The image benefits 
are recognized regarding customers, employees, potential employees, potential partner 
startups and investors. For instance, according to I1 (2016), the company needs to develop its 
employer image since they are recruiting plenty of new employees. In order to make 
Company I an attractive employer, it has to offer divergent options inside one established 
organization. The startup activities help to attract potential employees who are not regarded as 
established company-minded employees. 
 
“The brand and developing it. It’s perhaps also one point of view. It’s also quite close 
to culture and the point of view that we want to change the patterns of doing things and 
the culture of doing things. And by the way, by brand I mean not only how we are seen 
here in this market. It has perhaps even more importance in our employer image 
towards potential employees.” (I1, 2016)  
 
According to B2 (2106) and F1 (2016), the established company can provide brand benefits 
for the partner startup in order to help it to obtain investors and established customers. This 
finding suggests that the repute advantages may function in both directions. It is also notable 
that not all companies actively exploit brand benefits. Some companies are neutral or even 
quiet about their startup activity and do not actively communicate about it, for example in 
their annual reports. However, listed companies have to strictly obey the communications 
regulations aimed at them. For example, a listed company has to inform issues which have a 
significant effect on the financial standing and the future of the company. Moderate 
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communication about startup activities may therefore be literal interpretation of the 
paragraphs of the law. (E1, 2016.) Hence, it may be challenging for listed companies to gain 
all of the brand benefits of their startup activities. 
 
4.2.5 Social responsibility 
 
Some companies find that as established, dominant companies in their industry, it is their 
responsibility to support smaller companies. They feel that they have to help small companies 
in order to promote their own industry, in other words to keep the industry vital and renewing. 
Thus, the established companies do not necessarily consider relevant to act responsibly 
particularly towards startups. They consider a wider, solidarity perspective towards their 
industry or even towards the national economy. Also giving small companies opportunities 
for partnership is in itself regarded as a responsible action, since small companies, such as 
startups, are not always seen as potential partners. (B2, 2016; C1, 2016; F1, 2016; H1, 2016; 
H2, 2016; I1, 2016.) 
 
“And well, it’s crystal clear that it’s a difficult situation if the biggest player would not 
be interested in anything at all and still wanted the industry to develop. So - - the 
startups can’t evolve if the current players are not essentially involved in that.” (C1, 
2016) 
 
“So if we succeed in this, we will extensively promote the vitality of this society and of 
Finnish companies. And well, the Finnish national economy, when we are involved in 
this activity. So it’s perhaps that kind of broad, big thing which is not directly linked to 
our business but to the society. So this is very relevant.” (F1, 2016) 
 
Some of the established companies appear to reflect their responsibility towards startups in 
how they can help their partner startups to proceed. The established companies want to offer 
their partner startups reference stories in order to help them to acquire new customers and 
investors, to aid them to internationalize themselves and to offer continuity in the partnership 
in order to secure their work load. (B1, 2016; F1, 2016; H2, 2016.) The concept of being a 
platform or simulation environment for startups is also linked to the aspect of social 
responsibility. As a platform established companies can provide small companies more 
chances to develop their businesses (C1, 2016; F1, 2016). 
 
“And then of course, the continuity is very important for startups. So that it’s not only a 
short-lived development project but that they would get in to the industrial co-operation 
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and grow through that. And potentially use us to get gearing, to get growth funding.” 
(H2, 2016) 
 
“We too wanted to try and start to think about how these innovative growth companies 
could feed us and bring us ideas. And then the other way around, how we could offer a 
kind of development platform for startups.” (F1, 2016)  
 
One part of the social responsibility of startup activity are the financial matters. According to 
B2 (2016) and F1 (2016), startups are sometimes considered to be inexpensive or free 
collaboration partners, but it is still important to pay startups in the same way as to other 
partners and not have them to work for free. It is described simply as a question of fairness. 
 
“To my mind, it’s not fair to work for free. So for instance we were ready to pay a 
nominal amount of money also from the sketches. And from those first light offers. So 
it’s not fair and I do not in any case want to give that kind of image that big companies 
use startups because they are somehow cheaper.” (B2, 2016) 
 
“So overall we have ensured that we are able to do this [startup collaboration]. We have 
directed some resources to this and also paid the startups for the exercises we have had 
with them, - - . So with us, there has not been a need to work for free.” (F1, 2016) 
 
However, the social responsibility aspect is a side issue in startup activity engagement. 
Startup activity is not considered to be charity work but actual business activity. Social 
responsibility is therefore not the main aim for any of the interviewed companies, but startup 
activity is recognized to be beneficial also in this non-financial and indirect manner alongside 
pursuing the primary business aims. (B2, 2016; F1, 2016; H2, 2016; Confederation of Finnish 
Industries & TEKES, 2014.) 
 
”One point is that we can’t have this kind of corporate responsibility organization here 
which helps others, sort of under a corporate responsibility umbrella. That’s not the 
point either.” (C1, 2016) 
 
 
4.3 Challenges 
 
In addition to the previous favorable and positive aspects, established companies are reporting 
many challenges regarding their startup activity. These six challenges form the skeptical 
aspects of startup activity. They include aspects describing the pragmatic challenges and the 
principled reasons why to not conduct startup activity. The aspects describing the practical 
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challenges are (1) encountering and finding the startups, (2) financial matters and (3) cultural 
challenges. The aspects describing the principled reasons are (4) risky partners and (5) the 
effect of industry. The aspect of (6) the impact of management guidelines is describing both 
practical and principled reasons. 
 
Table 5 Challenges of startup activity 
 
No. Challenge Description 
1 Encountering and finding the startups How to find the potential 
partners and how to 
recognize the most 
suitable ones 
2 Risky partners The continuity of the 
business is uncertain. 
3 Financial matters Differing preconceptions 
on financial participation 
of established 
companies. 
4 The effect of industry Experienced industry-
specific challenges 
hinder the startup 
activities. 
5 Cultural challenges Different operations 
customs. 
6 The impact of management 
guidelines 
Lacking guidelines and 
resources. 
 
 
As the favorable aspects, all the presented challenges or skeptical aspects are found in many 
companies and are therefore not company-specific. The aspects are not exclusionary either: 
they are occurring simultaneously, in parallel and overlapping in the companies. The found 
aspects describing the challenges are listed and described briefly in Table 5 and more 
thoroughly one by one in their own subchapters. 
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4.3.1 Encountering and finding the startups 
 
In order to conduct external startup activity, which is more popular than the internal one 
according to the research materials, the established companies have to find suitable startups. 
The encounters between established companies and startups may be challenging, since the 
ways of searching and finding vary widely. Some of the established companies are actively 
contacted by startups and often every collaboration project or relationship starts from the 
initiative of startups (C1, 2016; C2, 2016; F1, 2016). However, according to G1 (2016), even 
if  Company G has been visibly active towards startups, no startup has ever contacted them 
and therefore G1 hopes more activity from startups. Also according to H1 (2016), Company 
H desires a more comprehensive coverage among startups in order to attract potential 
partners.  
 
“I don’t think any startup has called us. So it really goes the other way round. Perhaps 
their marketing has not developed to the level where it should be.” (G1, 2016)  
 
“So they should come and communicate their good news in a completely different way. 
Through various forums. I can’t find them all on internet. It starts more so that I hear 
from somebody, it goes as word of mouth.” (G1, 2016) 
 
The successful encounters may happen by chance, as was the case for Company F in one of 
their first large projects with a startup (F1, 2016). This means that the activity of startups 
towards the established companies is important in order to generate startup activity 
engagement. 
 
“And partly there is also a game of chance, when we talk about startups. Like I said this 
example of food e-store [the startup] is that we didn’t actively search for that kind of 
solution then. It just happened to be on a plate and they knew how to sell it for us and so 
it started. So it’s much about a game of chance too.” (F1, 2016) 
 
“These come up more in the way that they get some occasional publicity or that you 
bump into them at some event.” (A2, 2016) 
 
When the established company has found interesting and potential startups, another reported 
challenge in the encounter is how to recognize the realistic know-how and abilities of startups 
and thus knowing with which startups to co-operate. (B2, 2016; D1, 2016.) 
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“When it comes to startups, they are on such different levels and how do you then find 
out who really has something to offer? Because, well, startups, they are of course 
leaning forward when selling. So in this regard, do they have what they promise?” (D1, 
2016) 
 
“Well, we have had some cases where we have discovered some issues at the time we 
have already started the collaboration. That the startups haven’t quite been on the 
expected level, that technology and so on isn’t under control. Then we have stopped 
those operations we have had.” (E1, 2016) 
 
Also KPMG found out that according to 56% of their respondents, finding the right startups to 
cooperate with is difficult. The encounter challenge is bidirectional, since it is reported that it 
may be difficult for startups to find the right person inside the corporation to proceed with 
(KPMG, 2014.) Furthermore, according to KPMG (2015, 3), establishing the collaboration 
from the first meeting lasts circa 9,4 months, which also complicates the encounter of 
corporates and startups. The encounter may also be difficult since corporations do not 
publicly communicate which kinds of startups they are looking for and how they prefer to 
engage in startup activities. 
 
However, many of the companies report that they have continuously been contacted by 
startups. This depends either on that established companies have gained good reputation 
among startups or that they are major players of their industries nationally or also recognized 
internationally, or both. 
 
“Well, we also have very diverse ways for searching. But then of course, our company 
has also started to be well-known anyway, also outside the Finnish borders. We are 
contacted [by startups].” (E1, 2016) 
 
4.3.2 Risky partners 
 
Established companies consider small companies, such as startups, to be risky partners. There 
are several risks that may cease the business of a startup and thus jeopardize the delivery 
reliability and service security of established companies. Knowledge is concentrated to a few 
key persons, funding is often on an unreliable basis and technologies and products are novel 
and untested. Financial and temporal stability and durance may be required from the startup 
partners, which may mean that fledgling startups are rejected. (B2, 2016; D1, 2016, F1, 2016; 
H1, 2016; K1, 2016.) 
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“But in the small ones, if a key person leaves, the skills can drop to zero. The risk is 
bigger.” (H1, 2016)  
 
The most concerning issue is the unreliable continuity of the business of the startups. If 
established companies partner with startups and distribute their solution in their products or 
services, how can they assure their customers that the solution will function in the years or in 
some industries in decades to come? When partnering, the established companies do not 
acquire the know-how of their startup partners, and they are hence dependent on the partners 
and their survival. Established companies appreciate stability and continuity, which may be 
difficult for startups. (D1, 2016; F1, 2016; K1, 2016.) 
 
“Then we are again in the situation that you are developing products for customers and 
you don’t know if it [the startup] is still standing or not. In that case we should create a 
backup plan for how we are going to work. And on the other hand, when customers 
have learnt to trust us, how are we going to handle this situation.” (D1, 2016) 
 
Also the small work capacity of startups may cause problems for established companies, 
especially when subcontracting from startups. Established companies sometimes need volume 
in their orders, but small startups with only few employees cannot supply large orders or an 
extensive project. (J1, 2016.) 
 
The challenges of organizational immaturity have also been reported as one of the key 
challenges in the study of KPMG (2014). However, established companies find startups 
attractive and are therefore constantly trying to invent ways how to exploit startups and bring 
their solutions to their traditional business. Furthermore, even though startups are considered 
to be risky partners, startup activity may also reduce the risk level of the own business. 
 
“- - it’s a quite slow and a quite risky way, to go and familiarize by ourselves with all 
the trials. We rather buy the job somewhere outside, from those who already know how 
to do it. Then we can do a selection: is this the right partner or could this technology in 
question be something that we should focus on ourselves too.” (J1, 2016) 
 
4.3.3 Financial matters 
 
Financial matters may cause difficulties in terms of scarce resources of established companies 
and preconceptions of startups. Several companies report that collaboration negotiations 
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easily end due to disagreements of the amount of the financial participation from both parties. 
(A1, 2016; B2, 2016; D1, 2016; E1, 2016; G1, 2016.) 
 
“And when you ask about challenges. Very often the discussion either starts with or 
turns to the money issue. The discussion culminates to that issue, that well, now 
someone should start to put euros on the table. And then the hard thinking begins that 
okay, who is going to sponsor this thing.” (C1, 2016) 
 
“Startups often have a good idea, but little money. We just in principle don’t say ‘here 
you are, one hundred or a half million, try if that works and give us a stake from your 
company’. We don’t do that.” (C2, 2016) 
 
According to the interviews, the established companies seem to prefer collaborative solutions 
than only sponsoring startups with large amounts of money, which for startups seems to be a 
common approach. 
 
“Then we have had situations where we have progressed without any huge investment 
efforts. We have progressed by helping with facts. We have for instance developed a test 
plan together with other parties and financed that. And in the end the money that we 
have provided has been a fraction of the sum with which they have first approached 
us.” (C1, 2016) 
 
The established companies consider that it is usual for startups to assume that established 
companies will contribute with remarkable amounts of money. They also find that many 
startups have unrealistic expectations of the value of their products, which generally are 
unfinished for end users and still inapplicable for mass production or distribution. (A1, 2016; 
B2, 2016; D1, 2016; E1, 2016; G1, 2016; J1, 2016.) This notion, as every notion in this 
research, is a one-sided description from the standpoint of established companies and is 
therefore not an objective bilateral representation of the matter. 
 
“Maybe something that you can see is that startups, when they think they got a foot in 
the door, before there are any indications for value, they might suppose that we are 
some kind of a payment machine for them.” (D1, 2016) 
 
 
However, some established companies find it important to pay startups equally as to their 
other partners and to reserve a real budget for pilot projects (B2, 2016; D1, 2016; KPMG, 
2015; 7). Thus, the challenge of financial matters is rather about the different assumptions of 
the corporations and startups than about the unwillingness of the corporations to pay. 
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4.3.4 The effect of industry 
 
Several companies describe their industry and its customs as one reason of not conducting 
more startup activity. The own industry may be regarded as old-fashioned or the conditions 
too demanding for most startups, or the companies have not found enough startups from 
suitable industries. (A2, 2016; B1, 2016; H1, 2016; H2, 2016.) 
 
“I guess one thing is that perhaps in yritysyritys [Company H] there is no such culture 
or even in the whole industry, where you would take the startups seriously. First of all, 
you don’t even recognize them. Or they don’t come on to our industry, perhaps they 
rather go to somewhere else.” (H1, 2016)  
 
Also the experience and nature of startups matter. Established companies find that it would be 
important for startups to understand the foundations of the industry they are co-operating 
with. 
 
“Well of course in our industry you have to have some muscles. You have to have 
experience from this industry.” H1, 2016 
 
“It’s quite a threshold for startups to come here. And we can’t use that much time for 
teaching. You should be able to jump as it were a moving train. That’s why the medium-
size and small companies are definitely more potential partners than startups.” (H2, 
2016)  
 
“It’s about one out of ten startups, who would have possibilities in our industry, who 
themselves seem to perceive the opportunity. Perhaps here the paths are not crossing 
among the actors in the existing markets and these startups. As far as our industry is 
concerned.” (A2, 2016) 
 
“It’s often that the approval processes and such take so extremely long in different 
companies”. (B1, 2016)  
 
 
However, Company B also appreciates startups with no experience from their own industry, 
since they value the fresh view these kinds of startups can offer. 
 
“Firstly we thought about our own goals and set some objectives. For instance that the 
upcoming startup would not have done anything for our industry. So here we took a 
stand, we wanted their strength to be that they haven’t done forestry at all. Which 
means that we get a fresh pair of eyes looking at the whole industry.” (B2, 2016) 
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However, Company D is an exception regarding the effect of industry. It describes its industry 
as traditional and old-fashioned, but the company is still extensively engaging in startup 
activities. (D1, 2016.) 
 
4.3.5 Cultural challenges 
 
The cultural challenges in the startup activity of established companies concern the both 
parties. The cultural challenges that startups cause include challenges in the operating speed, 
oversimplification, adhering to company code and tendency to overestimate the readiness of 
their solution. The cultural challenges among established companies themselves are mainly 
about operating speed, disinclination to change the company or industry customs and differing 
conceptions on the readiness of the startups’ solutions. (A2, 2016; B2, 2016; F1, 2016.) In 
addition, according to A2 (2016) and F1 (2016), startups are focused on their own business 
and sometimes have difficulties to take into account the wider circumstances around their 
solution. There might also be challenges of trust due to the different cultures. 
 
“Perhaps from our perspective, one challenge has been this culture that we would have 
taken advantage of startups, - - to broadly take advantage of startups. So there might be 
some sort of trust issues. Especially from the other perspective. I think small companies 
don’t perhaps trust in corporations.” (C2, 2016) 
 
The challenges which originate from the cultural differences are often mentioned interrelated 
with processes and systems, particularly IT systems (B1, 2016; D1, 2016). 
 
“This was actually quite an interesting thing, it seemed that we in our team were the 
ones delivering these new IT issues. We as such don’t have anyone who would have in-
depth knowledge in IT, but the new IT issues came through these startups since they 
were doing things in a new, different way, which completely differs from the old IT 
legacy.” (D1, 2016) 
 
“Perhaps another thing that you should be prepared for is IT issues. What you use for 
communication and document management. And in the first place that the system 
development isn’t going in the traditional mode. And well, that you are ready to think 
about those new solutions.” (B2, 2016) 
 
According to B2 (2016), established companies need to fasten their processes when operating 
with startups. The indecisive behavior and bureaucracy of corporations is found to be one of 
the greatest challenges of the collaboration according to KPMG (2014). One of the cultural 
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difficulties in startup activity is the way of planning projects either precisely or long-term in 
advance (A2, 2016; B2, 2016; D1, 2016).  
 
“Well it’s quite hard to think milestones for 16 months. So almost every project that we 
carry under this digitalization headline, we approach them with this kind of digital 
minimum viable product thinking. And to adopt this [thinking] is surprisingly hard for 
many who have not worked in this kind of an environment.” (A2, 2016)  
 
The cultural differences are fundamental. Both KPMG (2014) and A2 (2016) describe that the 
operating circumstances and customs of startups and corporations are almost opposites to 
each other and something completely new for those who are beginning their startup activity 
engagement.  
 
“And now when these two operational cultures meet, every project hasn’t necessarily 
proceeded as you could have thought. So there has been toing and froing about what to 
do, because we have never done anything like this before.” (A2, 2016)  
 
4.3.6 Impact of top management guidelines 
 
The impact of top management guidelines is highlighted as the fundamental requirement of 
startup activity engagement, and particularly of extending startup activities. 
 
“But maybe I would point out the will of the very highest management as the most 
critical factor. Then there is a real definition of policy and on the other hand a real 
mandate for these developers and doers to do things. That the company seriously wants 
it.” (F1, 2016)  
 
“In our case matti meikäläinen [a management group member] has been a great 
sponsor. It’s really good that there is someone in the top management who trusts on the 
fact that development work is worth doing.” (B2, 2016) 
 
Top management members have the power of allocating resources and thus either enabling or 
impeding the startup activities in the lower organizational levels. However, no materials 
source suggested that the management would intentionally impede the startup activities of the 
company. Rather, it is about not making decisions on questions regarding startup activities. 
The organizations seem to hope for discussion and more explicit guidelines from the 
management about how to exploit startup activities. 
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“If the management doesn’t support and say that ‘hey, it’s worth to go for these 
initiatives’, the employees, we office workers and as far as middle management, we are 
like ‘damn, this is extra work’.” (B2, 2016) 
 
However, companies do execute startup activities without clear top management guidelines or 
direct, proactive support of top management. In the beginning, Company D (D1, 2016) 
commenced and developed its startup activities without top management support, and then the 
engaged activities convinced the top management. Later startup activities became on the 
agenda of top management and were highly favored. Company C (C1, 2016; C2, 2016) 
reports that their startup activities would benefit greatly from more elusive top management 
guidelines about startup activity, but also notes that the company is perhaps not yet mature 
enough for more extensive startup activities. 
 
In addition, it is not only the management guidelines which matter in the organizational levels 
when extending the startup activity engagement. According to B1 (2016), it is useful to build 
the startup activity engagement in a bottom-up direction. 
 
“So we have built up this in a bottom-up direction. I think it’s good because it’s like a 
process, you can’t really build it from above. Otherwise anything remarkable will never 
arise from it. That enthusiasm must be created inside the organization - -, and in my 
opinion we are doing well right now. You must have patience too. You can’t wait too 
much too fast but still you must progress systematically. That’s actually our goal.” (B1, 
2016) 
 
Evidence to the impact of top management support is also found in the reports (Confederation 
of Finnish Industries & Tekes, 2014; KPMG, 2014). It is also noted that specific innovation 
teams may lack the legitimacy of conducting and extending startup activities in their 
organizations (KPMG, 2015, 3). This too denotes that the support and guidelines of 
management is significant in order to foster startup activity engagement. 
 
4.3 Categories of startup activity engagement 
 
The foregoing aspects describe how varied themes established companies associate with their 
startup activity. The aspects are topic-specific, whereas the categorization of startup activity is 
created on the ground of company-specific research results. The company-specific results 
were compared and merged with interviewed companies with similar results. Finally, four 
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categories describing the startup activity of the interviewed established companies were 
recognized and named. In this categorization I describe how extensive startup activity the 
companies of the different categories conduct, how the companies view their startup activity, 
and what kind of entity the startup activities form in the companies. The recognized categories 
and the classification of the interviewed companies is listed in Table 6. 
 
Table 6 Categories and classification of the interviewed companies 
 
 Category  
Company 
 Industry 
1. No startup activity  K  machinery 
2. Opportunists  A  building products 
 C  energy 
3. Special know-how 
exploiters 
 B  forest 
 E  pharmaceuticals 
 G  recycling 
 H  technology 
  J  electronics 
4. Strategic exploiters  D  energy 
 F  retail 
 I  IT services and solutions 
  
 
The categories are presented with the help a list of attributes concerning startup activity 
engagement. The attributes of each category are then described and discussed. At the end of 
every category, the attributes are summarized in tables. The attributes used for discussing the 
categories are listed in Table 7. 
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Table 7 Attributes for discussing the categories 
 
No. Attribute describing the startup activity 
1. Forms of startup activities 
2. How systematic the approach is 
3. Time span 
4. Top management attitude 
5. Recognized benefits 
6. Recognized challenges 
7. Estimated impact on the current business 
8. Future plans 
9. View on startup activity 
 
 
The interviewed established companies can be divided into four categories or groups 
regarding the nature and phase of their startup activities. The first group, consists of one 
company which cannot be classified as opportunist. There was one company, Company K, 
which did not conduct almost any startup activity. This category is therefore called no startup 
activity.  
 
The second group, the beginners of the startup activities, is opportunists, who are practicing 
disorganized and occasional startup activity. Companies A and C are classified into this 
category. The third group is special know-how exploiters. They are aware that startups have 
expertise they need and they already know how to exploit it. The second group can be divided 
further into two groups: those who are seeking ways to increase and expand their startup 
activities and those who are content with their present situation, in other words who currently 
do not have any reasons to proceed further. The companies classified as special know-how 
exploiters are B, E, G, H and J. 
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The last and most advanced group is strategic exploiters, who have linked their startup 
activity directly to their strategy execution. These companies have sponsors in the top 
management and also clear management group responsibilities for their startup activities. The 
companies classified as strategic exploiters are D, F and I. 
 
4.3.1 No startup activity 
 
Company K has been contacted by startups and it has had meetings with potential startups. 
However, the negotiations have not proceeded further and thus Company K has not engaged 
in startup activities. (K1, 2016.) 
 
“Well mostly technology, mostly new technologies, new services. It [the contacts] is 
mainly about digitalization. IT and digitalization are the topics that the contacts 
concern.” (K1, 2016) 
 
Company K is sort of interested in startups: neither their management nor employees 
purposely prohibit startup activities or have a principle of not engaging in them. They simply 
have not yet met suitable and potential startups to collaborate with. (K1, 2016.) 
 
“But I don’t think anyone has anything against it, if we just find a good product and a 
good concept, so why not.” (K1, 2016) 
 
The representative of Company K reports that it is challenging to discover what the startups 
truly have to offer and what skills and capabilities they have. If there is no evident need for 
the solutions of startups and the understanding of the capabilities of potential startup partners 
is elusive, cooperation does not start. 
 
“There have been contacts, so it’s really hard to find the best ones. They may have good 
Power Points and good presentations --.” (K1, 2016) 
 
The reasons for not continuing negotiations with startups have on the one hand been the 
uncertainty of the real knowledge and capability of the potential partners, and on the other the 
uncertain continuity of the business of startups. Company K treats startups similarly with 
other types of potential partners. The uncertainty of the starting businesses has therefore 
appeared as an unacceptable characteristic of a potential partner. (K1, 2016.) 
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“Well perhaps in some cases we have been thinking about the continuity of the startup 
in the long run. When we buy, let’s say some feature in the software or some software 
product, we really try that the supplier would have continuity on the horizon. And with 
good financial standing in this sense that we get support from the component supplier.” 
(K1, 2016)  
 
However, Company K has organized a hackathon and the experience was considered to be 
very positive. The participants of the hackathon were not actual startup companies, but they 
were organized in startup-like teams. (K1, 2016.) 
 
“Then we said to one that ‘well okay, come to our hackathon weekend and show what 
you really can do’. It was a great opportunity to see what the teams really can do, those 
companies, and not only that they have good sales Power Points.” (K1, 2016) 
 
There is an interest in startups, but there has not yet been a special need that startups could 
have solved and the company has not yet found suitable collaboration partners. (K1, 2016.) 
Since there is only one company which does not conduct nearly any startup activity, I do not 
present a summarization of the attributes of this category. 
 
4.3.2 Opportunists 
 
The category of the smallest-scale startup activity is opportunists. These companies do not 
have any systematic approach to startup activity: the activity is done by chance and familiarity 
of own industry. The opportunists are either experimenting their first trials with startups or 
they have conducted small projects for some time. They are still rather familiarizing 
themselves with startup activity than actually exploiting it in their business. (A1, 2016; A2, 
2016; C1, 2016; C2, 2016.) As A1 (2016) describes, Company A is at the moment aiming to 
explore and understand what kinds of startups there are in the proximity of their industry. 
 
“We still believe that the startup world is such where we can potentially find new ideas 
and we are continuing to scan it with an open mind.” (A1, 2016) 
 
The forms of the startup activities vary among opportunists. Company A has conducted 
collaboration, acquisition, investments, screening and attended startup events (A1, 2016; A2, 
2016). Company C has conducted collaboration, investments, startup acquisitions, 
competitions, as well as attended events and hosted one hackathon event of their own (C1, 
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2016; C2, 2016). Company C was first a part-owner in a startup for five years, which lead to 
the acquisition of the startup (C2, 2016). 
 
”Yes, we had a good view to the operations through board membership.” (C2, 2016) 
 
Both companies are mainly unsystematic in their startup activity, but planning to organize it 
to a more systematic direction. According to C2 (2016), Company C is not mature and 
suitable enough for more structured startup activity engagement. However, it has begun to 
structure its internal innovation and development processes, which may also enhance startup 
activities. (A1, 2016; A2, 2016; C1, 2016; C2, 2016.) 
 
“I would say that there is nothing that systematic. Nothing systematic comes to my 
mind. That we would have searched particularly for a startup when I’ve been here. So 
they have been looked for and sifted with interest. But I don’t know anything that would 
have ended up with some systematic activity afterwards.” (C1, 2016) 
 
 The encounters happen mainly by chance when startups contact the companies or when 
someone in the organization hears or sees something interesting. Company A has only been 
contacted by a few startups, and Company C relies mostly on the activity of startups. (A1, 
2016; A2, 2016; C1, 2016; C2, 2016.) 
 
“But the uppermost, the only at all systematic operations model is that we have a 
certain number of people and when we go around the world. And we are all the time as 
antenna if there happened to come along something that looks interesting.” (A2, 2016) 
 
”Probably there is some kind of an external demand and pressure. That for now, it 
really goes in the direction that they contact us.” (C1, 2016) 
 
Company A has since 2013 been active in the United States concerning open innovation and 
therefore also active in the startup world. Elsewhere, Company A’s first steps and planning of 
startup activity have started in 2014 and the first acquisitions took place in 2016. Now the aim 
is to organize the startup activity systematically also in Europe. (A1, 2016; A2, 2016.) 
Company C also began its startup activity through open innovation and then met some 
startups coincidentally. During the last year, Company C has activated itself purposely 
towards startups. (C1, 2016; C2, 2016.) 
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The top management of opportunists primarily has a positive attitude towards startup activity. 
However, the startup activity is mostly not in their agenda otherwise than along with 
acquisitions and financial resource allocation regarding startup activity. (A1, 2016; A2, 2016; 
C1, 2016; C2, 2016.) In addition, the companies lack clear management guidelines about 
startup activity and thus the support from management may not be as systematic as it could 
be. 
 
“Well, certainly if there is a such message of how to act, how it would be worth acting 
or what it would be worth searching for. If this is very clear, then it’s a great 
opportunity and you can just link it [startup activity] to the processes. But there is no 
such clear message yet. Like when it pays off to cooperate or when it’s particularly 
useful, we have no this kind of specifications.” (C1, 2016) 
 
Company A clearly recognizes also the possibilities of developing their organization and 
operations through startup activity, whereas Company C does not experience such 
organizational benefits. (A1, 2016; A2, 2016; C1, 2016; C2, 2016.) The opportunists 
recognize the technology and digitalization know-how the startups hold and are interested in 
the new solutions they develop which could be applied to their industry. Thus, in that sense 
the opportunists resemble the special know-how exploiters. (A1, 2016; A2, 2016; C1, 2016; 
C2, 2016.) 
 
“So it’s opportunistic and it starts from these specific themes, which we are now up to. 
Especially this digitalization.” (A2, 2016)  
 
”The disruptive ideas may come much more likely from there [startups] than, well, from 
this zoo of dinosaurs.” (A1, 2016) 
 
The organizations of opportunists seem to express resistance to change when meeting new 
operating models through startup activity. According to A1 (2016), Company A might lack 
the will to take risks and according to A2 (2016), the organization has had challenges when 
operating with startups. Also Company C has had challenges in motivating the businesses to 
startup activity. 
 
“Well, it’s probably so that it sounds quite interesting, just go on and do it. I haven’t 
heard that anyone would stop anything. It’s really that people don’t see the need if there 
is no actual need. - - They do what is current. And our team has to guess what is current 
after five to ten years, so we have different point of views.” (C1, 2016) 
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Opportunists are uncertain about how they could use startup activity in their business on a 
larger scale. The companies have not yet decided how and where to systematically use 
startups and hence the startups are not partners among others. In reality, they are minor 
partners because they are not considered to be a choice for most of the needs. The 
opportunists face challenges in the internal guidelines and operations since they are not used 
to startup activity and they have not yet developed their own guidelines for startup activity.  
 
“Well, of course. It’s in a way a practice exercise as for how we can structurally work 
together with a company like a startup. And here we are desperately, like mad, trying to 
hinder this corporation from killing the whole startup.” (A2, 2016)  
 
The estimated impact of startup activity in the current business of the opportunists is very 
low. Since the actual startup activity is very recent, there are not yet many results and 
experiences of complete startup activity. (A1, 2016; A2, 2016; C1, 2016; C2, 2016.) 
 
 “At the moment, it’s marginally small.” (A2, 2016) 
 
However, the opportunists are seeking solutions how to overcome the challenges of startup 
activity and revise their practices to meet the requirements of startup collaboration. 
Companies A and C are planning to develop their startup activity to be more systematic and to 
have more versatile forms of startup activity. According to A2 (2016), Company A is 
discussing the possibility of their own accelerator program coordinated by a third party. 
 
“Of course we need evidence, this is quite a new topic, only some years old for us. On 
the other hand, we need a few cases to celebrate success, it always brings faith and 
surely also increases the will of risk-taking.” (A1, 2016) 
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Table 8 Summary of the characteristics in category opportunists 
 
Attribute  Description 
Forms of startup activities Mainly collaboration and events, also 
acquisitions, investments, competitions 
How systematic is the 
approach 
No systematic approach 
Time span Started two – three years ago. Most activity 
during last twelve months. 
Top management attitude Primarily positive but no guidelines or in 
advance allocated resources 
Recognized benefits Producing new ideas, special know-how, 
organizational spirit, social responsibility 
Recognized challenges Top management guidelines  
Estimated impact on the 
current business 
Very small 
Future plans Develop the activity to a more systematic 
direction, discussions of own guidelines 
View on startup activity Something you should be interested in and 
experimenting  
 
 
A summary of the characteristics of opportunists is presented in Table 8. As prerequisites for 
expanding their startup activities, opportunists mention young employees, results in the 
current activities and maturity of their company. The view on startup activity of opportunists 
may be described as something that is perhaps wise to be interested of, but something that 
they do not yet see as valuable enough. In addition, the positive effects or the organization is 
not yet ready to proceed faster. This category is called opportunists since the startup activity 
of the companies is not systematic but it is rather opportunistic: when a potential opportunity 
is discovered it may or may not be exploited. The companies have mainly not systematically 
created opportunities for themselves, rather exploiting the arising circumstances and 
encounters happening by chance. (A1, 2016; A2, 2016; C1, 2016; C2, 2016.)  
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4.3.3 Special know-how exploiters 
 
The special know-how exploiters have recognized that startups hold some special know-how 
which is not always found in other organizations – their own organizations, universities or 
other companies than startups. These companies exploit the special knowledge found in 
startups both from their own industry as well as other industries. Hence, the startup activity of 
the special know-how exploiters may also be called substance collaboration or partnership. 
 
“We had this goal that we know the forests but we don’t know for instance the mobile 
world. And for that we needed a partner who knows how to do it in mobile. And that’s 
how it is.”  (B2, 2016)  
 
“We have a dialogic connection with these kinds of startup firms or small firms that 
have been running their business for a couple of years. Because they have special know-
how that we don’t have and we both need each other.” (G1, 2016) 
 
”So our startup collaboration, it’s focused on this digitalization, automatization, ICT 
and then on some special technologies, special materials.” (H2, 2016) 
 
“We have collaborated with certain startups in the fields of special technologies. For 
example when we have explored the possibilities of augmented reality in our industry.” 
(J1, 2016) 
 
“But this kind of special know-how, which has started as a startup and they have then 
been able to grow quite well thanks to their special know-how, they grow to firms which 
collaborate with us, produce services.” (E1, 2016) 
 
Every special know-how exploiter engages in several forms of startup activity. Company B 
engages in screening, collaboration, hosting their own events and attending events (B1, 2016; 
B2, 2016). In addition, according to B1 (2016), Company B is operating in a so called startup 
mode itself in new business areas. Company E conducts screening, collaboration and 
partnerships and attends events (E1, 2016). Companies H and J have conducted screening, 
collaboration and acquisitions (H1, 2016; H2, 2016; J1, 2016), whereas Company G has 
participated in a corporate venture program and engaged in collaboration and screening (G1, 
2016). 
 
“In practice, it goes so that we have a project, sometimes it can be a smaller one, some 
technical trial, which is not even counted as a real project here at us.” (J1, 2016) 
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The startup activity of special know-how exploiters is somewhat systematic in the terms of 
their own activity towards startups. They screen startups and actively meet them, participate 
in startup programs and organize public challenges for startups. 
 
“International partnering events are one place where you can find them. And then there 
also national ones. That is perhaps universal, and it would be worth to encourage 
Finnish startups to go to them. Usually to those, they get support money for some 
governmental institution if you go there.” (E1, 2016) 
 
 
However, their startup collaboration is also conducted in a more planned way and less by 
chance. The special know-how exploiters often know what they want from startups and are 
actively searching for it. 
 
“And we have bought many of these technology companies over the years, which have 
in a way replaced something. They are a little like fillings in your teeth so that in a way, 
you had had a technology gap. And then we have been able to utilize these technologies 
in our bigger portfolio in the worldwide presence.” (H1, 2016) 
 
However, the operations models of startup activities are not as advanced as strategic 
exploiters have. The special know-how exploiters might take the special characteristics of 
startups into account in their collaboration, since they have experience in collaboration and 
they have learned what works and what does not. However, internal approaches pursuing to 
systematize and turn the separate startup activities into continuous company-wide activity are 
not present. 
 
“But we don’t have any that kind of priorities or considered strategies there [in startup 
activity].” (B1, 2016) 
 
The startups are mostly not considered to be a special group of partners, in other words they 
are mostly seen as partners among others. The distinct feature of special know-how exploiters 
is focusing quite strongly on the special know-how instead of valuing the special 
characteristics of startups. Startup also mostly meet the same requirements as the other 
partners. 
 
“That startup thing in itself does not create value.” (E1, 2016) 
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The time span varies, but some special know-how exploiters have a long history in startup 
activity. According to H1 (2016), Company H has done startup partnering in automation 
perhaps even 30 years and according to B1 (2016), Company B has collaborated with startups 
and engaged in startup-like activity for over ten years. Company E (E1, 2016) has 
collaborated with startups for approximately twenty years. 
 
“Actually, we have made some contracts even 20 years ago. Collaboration has just 
increased during the last ten years.” (E1, 2016) 
 
Representatives of G and J report that their startup activity engagement has increased in the 
last five years (G1, 2016; J1, 2016). Also according to B1 (2016), Company B has been 
increasing its startup activity engagement. 
 
“We have all the time aimed at extending our collaboration with the startup world in 
order to see how it can complement what we are doing here ourselves, or speed up 
development work. And the experiences have been very positive.” (B1, 2016) 
 
The top management of the special know-how exploiters is rather interested in startups and 
has a generally positive attitude on startup activity. Companies B, J, H and G have a 
management group member who is responsible for startup activities of the company as a 
sponsor, head of a project or who conducts it partly themselves. The management group 
responsibility denotes attention, allocated resources and direct top management support for 
the startup activity. The management group members responsible for the startup activity in 
Companies B and H possess the responsibilities through digitalization projects. 
 
“Well, in the first place, this digitalization is that we go through it in every management 
group meeting, and I lead that digitalization program, so we then follow that. And we 
also have our CEO, when I lead it [the digitalization project] as a director and I’m 
excited about it, we only have the CEO above me and he is very excited too.” (H1, 
2016) 
 
 
However, startups are not mainly on the agenda of the management group of special know-
how exploiters otherwise than through the digitalization projects or due to acquisitions or 
financial resource allocation. 
 
“Very little. It doesn’t come directly from our strategy.” (G1, 2016) 
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“Yes and then well, in strategy work we screen where we could find the best resources 
to execute the strategy. So then these previously mentioned technology startups may be 
on the agenda of the management group because of this.” (J1, 2016) 
 
Some of the companies recognize the cultural and operational benefits of startup activities, 
but some do not. The organizational benefits are described as learning, energy, focus and 
enhancing processes. 
 
“The strength of startups is that there is a powerful energy and the focus is on the 
actual making. And the will to achieve significant results fast. The process is not 
necessarily always the best possible, but it’s compensated by the good will to proceed 
things. And in this sense their strengths complete us well, and then our own 
organization learns a lot in the process. That new course of action.” (B1, 2016) 
 
Company E has found collaboration with service startups beneficial, since it has allowed them 
to focus their own resources to more useful objects (E1, 2016). Thus, the operational benefits 
are not experienced through the different operations logics of startups, but through finding 
suitable partners. 
 
“We surely don’t do it for charity when we buy those services, but it’s good that there 
are these available. In that sense it accelerates our process. And you can think about 
that, since you have limited resources yourself. So when you have these available you 
can focus to develop your own resources to those things that are not that easily 
available.” (E1, 2016) 
 
Some special know-how exploiters report about resistance to startup activity in their 
organizations. B1 (2016) describes business units of Company B where resistance appears as 
“sleeping beauties” meaning that those units have not yet recognized the benefits of the 
startup activity and are therefore not enthusiastic about it. 
 
“Then we have these particular business units, which I call sleeping beauties, which 
haven’t really woken up yet. They take their time and then, in the course of time, they 
will wake up.” (B1, 2016) 
 
The estimated impact of startup activity on the current business is very low. Some effect on 
the ambience of the organization is reported, but the impact on current business is described 
minor. (A1, 2016; H2, 2016). 
 
“Very small.” (H2, 2016) 
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“Well if you look at the wholeness now, you have to be realistic that the part is, well, 
especially if you look at the current situation, it’s rather small. But, strongly growing.” 
(B1, 2016) 
 
The special know-how exploiters can be divided into two groups: those who want to proceed 
and extend their startup activity and to those who do not feel any need for proceeding and 
who are content with their current activity. For instance, according to B1 (2016), Company B 
is considering venture fund investments and according to B2 (2016), there has been thoughts 
about how to transform the startup activity into a company-wide, systematic and continuous 
activity instead of single projects. However, it is not completely clear, in which kinds of 
projects startup activity would be applied inside the company. 
 
“Even in small projects we could open our doors and discuss with startups if they could 
help us. We could keep that in mind when we start those projects. That we would think 
‘would this be possible’. So we could perhaps ask outside this house if there are 
[startups], since there are sure enough makers.” (B2, 2016) 
 
Also G1 (2016) considers startup activity to be a continuing and increasing phenomenon 
inside their organization.  
 
“I see that it will continue. But it will continue very likely as more intensive than so far. 
We really have to move on to the present, in the first place. Our industry is quite old-
fashioned as business.” (G1, 2016) 
 
The stance special know-how exploiters have towards startup activity is rather eager and 
positive. Startups are mainly considered to be partners among others and extensive ways of 
engaging in startup activity are not explored. The view on startup activity may be described as 
a good source of specific knowledge. 
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Table 9 Summary of the characteristics of the category special know-how exploiters 
 
Attribute  Description 
Forms of startup 
activities 
Acquisitions, collaboration, investments, 
venturing.  
How systematic is the 
approach 
Own activity towards startups, an intent for 
ongoing startup activity. Management 
responsibilities provide follow-up of the startup 
activities. 
Time span Experience from a couple of years to even 
decades long. Activity has mostly increased 
during the last years. 
Top management attitude Management group responsibilities, 
encouraging the organization. 
Recognized benefits Acquiring special know-how, enthusiasm,  
Recognized challenges Systematic continuity of startup activities, 
some organizational resistance to change, 
Estimated impact on the 
current business 
Very small. 
Future plans Polarized: eager to extend and try new 
activities or contentment with the current 
amount of activities. 
View on startup activity Useful additional source of special know-how. 
 
 
A summary of the discussed characteristics of special know-how exploiters is presented in 
Table 9. According to C2 (2016), extending startup activity engagement has to be made 
through the results of current startup activity engagement. 
 
“Well, I myself believe in these pilots. And in the results you get from pilots. Either the 
results we get here at us or then through benchmarking from other companies. So it will 
surely wake people up. So it [increasing startup activity] will not happen with any 
declaration or these things.” (C2, 2016) 
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4.3.4 Strategic exploiters 
 
Three of the interviewed companies are identified as strategic exploiters. Companies D, F and 
I significantly use startup activities in their strategy execution and they all have clear 
management group responsibilities for their startup activities. Company I is primarily seeking 
growth, F renewal and D both growth and renewal, according to their strategies. These 
companies have clearly recognized how to exploit the special know-how of startups in order 
to develop their businesses. In addition, during their startup activities, they have also 
recognized other indirect or non-financial benefits, which have become part of their reasons 
for executing startup activity. (F1, 2016; D1, 2016; I1, 2016.) 
 
“So it has clearly a strategic linkage, this our startup activity.” (F1, 2016)  
 
“And then we also have at the moment, even defined in our strategy, that we want to be 
in this startup ecosystem, energy startup ecosystem, a major player in Finland.” (D1, 
2016) 
 
“Well, in my opinion it came from our strategy.” (I1, 2016) 
 
Companies D, F and I are all engaging simultaneously in multiple forms of startup activity. 
Company D has engaged in acquisition, collaboration and partnerships, made investments 
directly and through venture capital funds, participated in a corporate venture program, 
organized challenges, and attended startup events. In addition, Company D has internal 
startups and it has organized their own accelerator program with for example boot camps and 
jury. (D1, 2016.) Company F has collaborated and partnered with startups, participated in a 
corporate venture program, established their own internal incubator and participated in and 
collaborated with events. Company I has collaborated and partnered with startups, attended 
events and acquired startups. Most recently it has launched an internal incubator in order to 
screen and incubate new ideas of anyone wanting to become an entrepreneur inside an 
established company. Thus, strategic exploiters can also be distinguished from other 
categories in how systematic their approach is and how designed forms they use in their 
startup activity engagement. 
 
These companies have clear objectives for startup activity and hence startups are not 
considered to be only partners among others. Companies D, F and I have specific, advanced 
operations models for startup activity and these models are designed to perceive the special 
 91 
characteristics of startups. Strategic exploiters have recognized that the startup activity does 
not succeed with the same rules and customs as the traditional business. 
 
“And it’s actually depending on that, if the startups are going through the same channel 
than every other supplier, then it’s quite hopeless. If we find for them that own separate 
channel to cooperate through and have mandate to do that. So then it’s working.” (D1, 
2016) 
 
The companies have also taken into account how startups will reach the established 
companies and the right persons inside the companies. For instance, Company D has an 
always open contact form for startups and Company F has planned the same solution. (F1, 
2016; D1, 2016; I1, 2016.) 
 
”How we can try something easily, so that we will not in a way, mess up the existing 
system. And at the same time we shouldn’t set so heavy requirements to piloting, 
because if we do, they will not come true.” (D1, 2016)  
 
Company D has made its first startup investments in 2007 and in 2008 it joined a venture 
capital fund. Both startup investments were made in order to monitor technological 
development outside their own core competence. The discovered strategic alignments are very 
recent: Company D has a new strategy where the entrepreneurial startup activities have a 
major role since 2016, Company F since 2014 and Company I since 2016. Also the 
organizational changes made in order to foster startup activity are very recent. Thus, the 
extensive activity is still very fresh. (F1, 2016; D1, 2016; I1, 2016.) 
 
“So you could say that within a year, [startup activity] it has increased tenfold in the 
agenda of the top management.” (D1, 2016) 
 
The role of top management ambitions is significant for the startup activities of Companies D, 
F and I. The startup activity is on the agenda of the management group and in the interest of 
CEOs. Both Companies D and F emphasize the significance of the interest and participation 
of their current CEOs. All of the strategic exploiters have also made changes in their 
organizational structure in order to foster startup activity. Company D has established a new 
technology and ventures unit which is the only responsibility area of one management group 
member. Company I has established a new management group position for fostering 
entrepreneurship and startup activity. (D1, 2016; I1, 2016.) 
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“So, actually, a couple of years ago our new or then new CEO matti meikäläinen pretty 
strongly stated the importance of renewal and innovation activity for the success of the 
company.” (F1, 2016)  
 
 
The significance of management group responsibilities is also recognized strongly in 
Company I. 
 
“We have one cornerstone, which is that when we make certain choices in our 
strategies, they remain. The choices remain only on the Power Point level if you can’t 
find management responsibilities in the organization to those choices. But when they 
are main management responsibilities they are not some side issues in one’s job. - - If 
this is not in the strategy and if you can’t see it in implementation, so then it’s just 
dabbling something on the side which withers away and dies in time.” (I1, 2016) 
 
Startup activities are also interconnected directly to generating new businesses.  
 
 “It’s now our task to produce new business starts for these growth projects, or for 
internal startups. In addition, we support the existing business to transform itself and do 
things in new ways.” (D1, 2016) 
 
Cultural or operational change can be seen as one of the business development aims regarding 
startup activities. The companies are pursuing culture or operations change since they believe 
it makes their organizations and thus businesses faster, more effective and more enthusiastic. 
(F1, 2016; D1, 2016; I1, 2016.) 
 
”Then if you think that now during my time - -. Our whole operational environment is 
changing to something very different than it has been. The future is much more insecure 
and in a way this startup kind of way of doing things is what we should learn.” (D1, 
2016) 
  
Not only are the strategic exploiters using startup activities actively in their business 
development, but they have also recognized indirect and non-financial benefits. These 
identified benefits consist of benefits on brand and image, social responsibility and 
organizational atmosphere. Company I sees that their startup activity affects their employer 
image and brand very positively. According to I1 (2016), the effects on employer image are 
even more important than the effects to the company brand in order to drive successful 
business in their market. (F1, 2016; D1, 2016; I1, 2016.) 
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“So we are forced to develop ourselves also from the perspective of the employer 
image, for the potential employees. And then you can’t just be old-fashioned and rusty, 
but you have to be able to offer your employees different options.” (I1, 2016). 
 
Startup activity is also regarded as part of social responsibility and good corporate citizenship. 
According to F1 (2016), Company F feels that acting as a platform for small growth 
companies is part of their responsibilities as a good corporate citizen. In addition, according to 
F1 (2016), Company F has recognized that the startup activity has significantly improved 
internal collaboration across business lines and functions.  
 
“Yes it is, it has hugely increased that interdisciplinary doing inside this house. So 
across different units, specialists now talk together and share their thoughts. In many 
big companies you operate too much in the siloes, like you have those certain areas of 
responsibilities. And then you according to them and there is no co-operation between 
the units. So surely that [startup activity] has already changed this.” (F1, 2016) 
 
How have the strategic exploiters become strategic exploiters of startup activity? The 
prerequisites for extending startup activity are trials, strong will and ambitions of top 
management, resource allocation in advance, practical operations models designed for 
startups, and the commitment of business lines. The strategic exploiters do not have identical 
startup activity backgrounds, which indicates that startup activity can be raised to a strategic 
level from many starting points. (F1, 2016; D1, 2016; I1, 2016.) 
 
“Yes. That’s like totally a key thing. So it’s one lesson too. If you start thinking 
something up, developing, trying something, which is tightly linked to the existing 
business, the ownership has to be quite strongly there in the business.” (F1, 2016)  
 
One of the benefits of active startup activity is a better coverage among startups, which in turn 
leads to more good quality encounters with startups: 
 
“We got within the program all in all somewhat 44 applications, when there was the 
search, a certain application period. And I see that it was encouraging, startups clearly 
became interested in us. It has then actually fed and spawned so that almost monthly 
there are several references from startups that ‘we have this kind of solution, can we 
come and present it or would you be interested in that’.” (F1, 2016)   
 
Although the strategic exploiters are in many ways advanced in their startup activities, they 
are still continuously looking for ways to improve their startup activity operations models and 
ways to overcome the recognized challenges. The challenges are experienced both in the own 
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organization and in startups. For instance, the companies have recognized and still struggle on 
how to customize the protocols and systems of corporations suitable for startups. (F1, 2016; 
D1, 2016; 11, 2016.) 
 
“Well perhaps it’s in a way the downside that as a large company we have of course 
certain protocols which we have to follow. And of course the continuity and stability are 
important for the existing business. There is then always a little reconciliation how this 
new solution is brought to the basic infrastructure, to the heavy-duty, how to be agile.” 
(F1, 2016) 
 
Company D has experienced difficulties in project planning regarding the startup activity. The 
organization has had to learn how to take small risks in terms of short pilots in order to 
estimate if the startup is useful for them or not. In addition, since the more extensive and more 
resourced startup activity is still recent, it has not yet reached the organizations of strategic 
exploiters thoroughly. Company D reports challenges of attracting people from across 
business lines to startup activity. The difficulties of startup activity concerning startups are 
especially the attitudes on financial questions. (F1, 2016; D1, 2016.) 
 
“The risk is very small. But when we are doing this startup thing and you don’t know 
for sure what you are going to get out from it. And that’s quite a difficult thing for an 
organization like this. To channel time to that kind of doing where you don’t know what 
you are going to get out of it. So in my mind, that’s one challenge.” (D1, 2016)  
 
 
Company I has experienced balancing the resources and rules between internal startups and 
the rest of the organization particularly challenging. 
 
“What we have been discussing a lot with these startup leaders, that in some cases it’s 
easier to recruit or partner with external parties than to get the know-how inside our 
organization. Even though we have 13 000 internal employees, which may sound weird, 
but this is just how it is. But on the other hand, it’s the freedom what we have given to 
these startups. So if it’s easier, then they cut corners, where it’s easier to develop their 
business. And then they balance it themselves that how much it’s reasonable to recruit 
and how much it’s reasonable to partner with other growth companies or something 
else. But that, finding the internal balance seems always to be such a real difficulty.” 
(I1, 2016) 
 
The strategic exploiters estimate the impact of startup activity on the current business as quite 
small in terms of financial matters but important in terms of growth initiatives and cultural 
change. The startup activity has already affected the organizations of strategic exploiters by 
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affecting the new strategy, helping to recognize the need for culture change, raising the spirit 
in the organization and helping in cross-organizational collaboration. (F1, 2016; D1, 2016; I1, 
2016.) 
 
“If we think in numbers it’s still rather small.” (D1, 2016) 
 
“The importance at the moment is surely this cultural change and then we get those 
growth initiatives from there.” (D1, 2016) 
 
“So we extend our business and we extend in general this startup-like operations model 
comprehensively, like to drive forward our new businesses” (I1, 2016) 
 
Companies D, F and I all have plans of improving and extending their startup activity and 
they are continuously considering new forms of startup activity. There are plans that have 
already been put into practice and plans that are still unrealized. Company I has very recently 
launched a new long-term business incubation program. 
 
“So for instance, we now published the new strategy of XXXX [the company]. And now 
for the first time we will have this [startup activity], also on the management group 
level. And I have the privilege to lead it now as the management group member. And we 
are starting a completely separate business, which is founded on running startups.” (I1, 
2016) 
 
“Another model is perhaps just that what you earlier were asking, that could we be 
part-owners in some kind of a venture capitalist-like role. So it’s one option for sure. 
That we don’t integrate those startups inside this house, or either operate with 
completely external startups, but this kind of venture capitalist role is something in 
between them. So we put money on the table and are part-owners and then get one part 
of that success. It’s perhaps that kind of model that we consider when we are 
proceeding. That does it become current.” (I1, 2016) 
 
According to F1 (2016), Company F has recognized the need and planned two-speed 
development, a development model which has its own channels for agile and quick projects 
with small partners and for large and long-term projects with established partners. According 
to D1, Company D may have more internal startups in the future. (F1, 2016; D1, 2016; I1, 
2016.) 
 
“Well, we have not yet made it to the solutions, but we have recognized targets of 
development in the technology side. We would like to offer a kind of platform of agile 
development on top of the basic heavy-duty doing, so that we would have the 
opportunity of let’s say two-speed development.” (F1, 2016) 
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Table 10 Summary of the characteristics in category strategic exploiters 
 
Attribute  Description 
Forms of startup 
activities 
Collaboration, collaboration projects, 
partnerships, internal startups, internal 
entrepreneurship, acquisitions, programs.  
How systematic is the 
approach 
Specific systems and guidelines for startup 
activity. 
Time span An intent and actions for long-term continuity. 
Top management attitude Active top management support and attention, 
management group responsibilities, clear 
guidelines. 
Recognized benefits Business development, operations 
development, strategic capabilities, 
organizational atmosphere, employer brand, 
social responsibility, coverage among startups. 
Recognized challenges Inflexibility of internal processes, continuity of 
startup activities, motivating and engaging 
enough employees. 
Estimated impact on the 
current business 
Small in financials, but significant in growth 
initiatives and culture change. 
Future plans To extend, diversify and develop startup 
activities. 
View on startup activity A significant tool for strategy execution.  
 
 
 
Strategic exploiters view their startups as a source of strategically important resources and as 
an important source of renewal and growth. The stance towards startup activity is positive, 
eager, expectant and trustful. This category is named strategic exploiters since Companies D, 
F and I consider the linkage of startup activity and strategy very natural and obvious. (F1, 
2016; D1, 2016; I1, 2016.) 
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“And working with startups will surely change the culture. These hungry teams from 
startups come and think a little differently and they come here to our networks. They do 
some things and so it will surely teach our gang and change our operational culture.” 
(F1, 2016) 
 
The summary of the characteristics in the category of strategic exploiters is presented in Table 
10. When comparing to reports, KPMG (2014) found that startup collaboration was not yet 
central in the strategies of corporations. However, a year later, KPMG (2015) has found 
examples of strategic investments in startups and strategic partnerships. Also INSEAD (2016) 
reports about strategic investments in startups and about strategic third-party ecosystem, 
where startups participate. However, KPMG (2014; 2015) and INSEAD (2016) do not 
consider startups clearly in a strategic light. Nesta (2015) connects startup activities with 
innovation strategy, strategic investments, strategic expansion in new markets and strategic 
business partnerships. 
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5 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The purpose of this study was to describe and analyze corporate entrepreneurship in the form 
of startup activity. Furthermore, the study has explored how established companies engage in 
startup activities, why or why not established companies engage in startup activities, and how 
extensively established companies engage in startup activities. I have explored this purpose 
and questions through reviewing previous literature of corporate entrepreneurship and through 
a qualitative study based on semi-structured interviews of representatives of eleven 
established companies from varied industries. 
 
In this chapter I discuss the main empirical and conceptual findings of the research. I 
particularly present findings that are supplementary or conflicting in the light of earlier 
theoretical discussions or challenge them. Furthermore, I present managerial implications as 
well as review and discuss the limitations of the study. Lastly, I present suggestions for 
further research on the topic. 
 
5.1 Startup activities as corporate entrepreneurship engagement 
 
The research objective of the study was to describe and analyze corporate entrepreneurship 
in the form of startup activity. In order to answer this, I have defined startup activity as all 
activity that established companies conduct in collaboration with startups, related to startups 
and as startups. I have collected my research materials according to this definition and 
interviewed company representatives who are involved in startup activity in their companies 
and are suitable interviewees. According to the review of previous theoretical discussion and 
the empirical analysis, startup activity can be seen as a sub-concept and one manifestation 
form of the theoretical main concept of corporate entrepreneurship. According to Covin and 
Kuratko (2010, 107), corporate entrepreneurship refers to entrepreneurial, renewal and 
innovation related activities and phenomena inside established organizations. Also the 
empirical analysis confirms this: startup activity refers to entrepreneurial, renewal and 
innovation related phenomena inside established companies. 
 
I have thoroughly described and analyzed corporate entrepreneurship in the form of startup 
activity. Therefore, one theoretical contribution of the study was to map and document a 
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divergent manifestation of corporate entrepreneurship, as Dess et al. (2003) suggest is 
relevant for corporate entrepreneurship research. The analysis on startup activity also supports 
the view of heterogeneity and broadness of corporate entrepreneurship, which is described for 
example by Covin and Miles (1999) and Phan et al. (2009). Established companies engage in 
startup activities in very divergent ways, so according to this analysis, corporate 
entrepreneurship is heterogeneous and broad even inside its one manifestation form. 
 
Furthermore, this study develops an understanding of startup activities as one entirety. The 
previous research by Kohler (2015) and Weiblen and Chesbrough (2015) has presented 
similar spectrums of startup engagement. However, these spectrums have focused only on 
certain forms of startup activities and how companies engage in these forms. Thus, my 
contribution is that both my theoretical framework and empirical analysis highlight the 
perspective of the established companies in a new way. I have explored, described and 
analyzed how they view their startup activities as one entirety and how they regard the role of 
their startup activity in their businesses.  
 
There are also differencies between startup activity and corporate entrepreneurship. The two 
forms of corporate entrepreneurship, corporate venturing and strategic entrepreneurship, are 
presented in the previous literature as very separate phenomena (Guth & Ginsberg, 1990; 
Morris et al., 2008). In the empirical analysis I did not find a similar noticeable division 
regarding startup activity. Some of the startup activities of the interviewed companies were 
intended to create new businesses and some renewal in the old business, which refers to the 
division of corporate venturing and corporate entrepreneurship. However, the representatives 
of the established companies did not talk about two different modes of startup activities, and 
comparison between these two forms did not arise. The research suggests that the different 
forms of startup activity are perceived to be more interrelated with each other than what the 
theory suggest to be the case in corporate entrepreneurship. 
 
I have explored the phenomenon of startup activity through the following research questions: 
(1) “How do established companies engage in startup activities?”, (2) “Why or why not do 
established companies engage in startup activities?”, and (3) “How extensively do established 
companies conduct startup activities?”. I have answered the first research question by 
describing and analyzing the forms and time span of startup activity and the partner status of 
startups. My research suggests that established companies engage in startup activities in very 
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various ways, which is also demonstrated in earlier research (Kohler, 2016; Weiblen & 
Chesbrough, 2015). The forms and time span of startup activity engagement vary among the 
research subject, among the presented categories and also inside the companies depending on 
which kind of project is in question. However, external activities appear to be more common 
and popular than internal ones. 
 
As the answer to the second research question, I have presented favorable and negative 
aspects towards startup activity according to what arose from the empirical materials. The five 
favorable aspects, (1) keeping up with the changes of business environment, (2) developing 
the business, (3) developing the organization, (4) repute advantages, and (5) social 
responsibility, represent reasons and purposes for engaging in startup activity. The six 
negative aspects, (1) encountering and finding the startups, (2) risky partners, (3) financial 
matters, (4) the effect of industry, (5) cultural challenges, and (6) the impact of management 
guidelines, represent challenges which established companies are facing when engaging in 
startup activities. In addition, the experiences and viewpoints of Company K, which is placed 
in the category of “no startup activity”, answer for their part to the question of why not to 
engage in startup activities. Neither suggestions for favorable nor negative aspects towards 
startup activity have been presented in previous literature. These findings are therefore a 
concrete theoretical suggestion of the themes that established companies interrelate to startups 
and startup activity. 
 
The extent of the startup activities, the answer to the third research question, is described and 
analyzed through the categories of startup activity engagement. According to company-
specific analysis, I suggest four categories to describe the extent of and approach to startup 
activity engagement: (1) no startup activity, (2) opportunists, (3) special know-how exploiters, 
and (4) strategic exploiters. The categorization also partly answers the first research question 
of how established companies engage in startup activities, since it describes and presents the 
company-bound approaches to startup activity engagement. This categorization is one of the 
most important contributions of the study, since previous literature has not suggested any 
categorizations on different perspectives established companies hold to startup activity 
engagement. Only models or forms of how to practically engage in startup activity are 
presented (Kohler, 2016; Weiblen & Chesbrough, 2015). These models do not describe the 
differences between established companies as startup activity engagers, as my categorization 
does. 
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5.1.1 Forms of engaging in startup activities 
 
Here I compare and reflect the theoretical framework of forms of engaging in corporate 
entrepreneurship to my empirical findings regarding startup activities. Main notions of the 
comparison are illustrated in Figure 11. The aim has not been to test if the theoretical 
framework of corporate entrepreneurship is accurate on startup activity, but with the help of 
the framework interesting notions may be recognized from the empirical materials. The 
theoretical framework of the forms of corporate entrepreneurship suggests three levels of 
corporate entrepreneurship engagement. When it comes down to the empirical findings of 
startup activity, startup activity engagement appears to happen mostly on a practical and 
pragmatic level. The startup activities are mostly considered and discussed on the level of 
separate, single, concrete means and forms of co-operation.  
 
Among the studied companies, many of the forms are tested for the first time or initiated only 
recently. The forms are employed mainly more by accident or opportunity than by design. 
Most of the companies lack orderliness of what they pursue from startup activity engagement 
and thus what startup activities they engage in. Most of the concrete means of the theoretical 
framework appeared in my empirical research. However, joint ventures and spin-offs did not 
appear almost at all in my empirical materials, even though they are well acknowledged in the 
literature (). 
 
The level of structured models could be recognized, but in the studied companies, the startup 
activities are mostly not organized through separate concrete means. However, structured 
models seem to be appearing: in the analysis, I found examples of first startup program trials 
and a very recent establishment of a corporate incubator. 
 
Compared to the theoretical framework of the study, I found that only first signs of corporate 
incubation are appearing, and this was especially among the strategic exploiters. The strategic 
exploiters also indicate characteristics of entrepreneurial strategies, but since I did not study 
the strategies of established companies, I have not reviewed and explored them separately and 
cannot classify them. Corporate venturing split the interviewed companies. Many of the 
companies had made investments, but still as the starting point for startup activity 
engagement, companies mainly appeared to prefer other forms. 
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Figure 11 The theoretical framework of forms of corporate entrepreneurship compared to the 
empirical analysis of startup activity 
 
In sum, even if the conceptual forms or characteristics appear among the research subject, the 
studied established companies do not mostly consider their startup activities to be on the level 
of conceptual forms. The Finnish companies engaged in startup activities mostly associate 
their activity to practical matters. They conceive different features of types of corporate 
entrepreneurship, but they do not plan or perceive their startup activities through the types in 
the way the theory defines. Startup activity engagement happens and is discussed mostly on 
the level of concrete means, apart from strategic exploiters who engage and discuss startup 
activity on all of the levels that the theoretical framework of corporate entrepreneurship 
presents. 
 
5.1.2 Purposes of engaging in startup activities 
 
Here I compare and reflect the theoretical framework of purposes of engaging in corporate 
entrepreneurship to the empirical findings regarding startup activities. Main notions of the 
comparison are illustrated in Figure 12. I Since the startup activity is mostly not planned and 
designed in advance, but engaged in when facing opportunities, the studied Finnish 
companies do not express the purposes of startup activity in the way that theory suggests. The 
level is more concrete. Instead, the purposes of the theory are experienced as benefits of 
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startup activity engagement, not in advance defined purposes. The study suggests that the five 
favorable aspects to startup activity are also the purposes of startup activity. 
 
Compared to the theoretical framework of this study, the studied Finnish established 
companies do not regard the fundamental purpose of startup activities, in other words 
surviving in a changing and competitive business environment, as strongly as the theory 
suggests. According to the empirical findings, companies want to keep up with the changing 
business environment, but they often do not perceive it as severe as surviving. The pursued 
main capabilities of my theoretical framework, renewal, innovativeness and generating new 
businesses, are recognized in the empirical study. However, the level is mostly very practical: 
new ideas, new thoughts and speed to operations are desired. 
 
 
Figure 12 Theoretical framework of purposes of corporate entrepreneurship compared to the 
empirical analysis of startup activity 
 
On the level of concrete purposes, startup activities may contribute to a new strategic 
direction and organizational transformation. But according to the study, it is not the purpose 
of startup activities. Domain redefinition appears as one goal of strategic exploiters. Business 
model reconstruction may happen through startup activities, but it is mostly not pursued. The 
most evident of the practical purposes that the theory suggest is speed and focus on 
operations. This appears in the empirical findings as developing the organization. Opportunity 
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seeking is also employed, since most of the startup activity engagement is opportunity seeking 
in new ways that established companies have not tried before. 
 
5.1.3 About the categorization 
 
As one of the main findings of this research, I have presented a suggestion of how established 
companies view their startup activities. The categorization is four-part: no startup activity, 
opportunists, special know-how exploiters, and strategic exploiters. It is noteworthy to 
remember that this categorization is done on the ground of the empirical materials of the study 
and thus the companies are classified in relation to the startup activities of each other. For 
example, the strategic exploiters might perhaps not rank as advanced as this categorization 
suggests, if they would be compared against international examples of corporations pursuing 
very intense and extensive startup activity. 
 
The study did not find examples on long-term extensive and intensive startup activity of 
Finnish established companies. Some companies had engaged in startup activities for a very 
long time, even twenty years, and some companies currently engaged very intensively in 
startup activity. The long-term results of intensive startup activity are therefore still expected. 
The same applies to the strategic level of startup activities: startup activity has been in the 
strategic level only since recent years, and therefore the long-term results of strategic startup 
activity are still expected. 
 
In addition, although the categories also represent the extent of the startup activity 
engagement, the study does not suggest that the startup activity would be an evolutionary 
process proceeding according to the defined categories. Based on the study, it is impossible to 
say if the increasing extent of startup activity among the categories means that the categories 
would be evolutionary. It is also impossible to analyze if the companies proceed in the 
categories or in which categories the companies would have belonged earlier. The companies 
in the discovered categories have begun their startup activity engagement in very different 
ways and forms. Therefore, the analysis neither suggests any model of how the startup 
activity engagement begins or how the companies have become representatives of the certain 
categories. 
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5.2 Managerial implications 
 
In this study I have mapped and described ways and forms of how established companies can 
engage in startup activities. The mapping and description may help the managers to 
understand the variety of corporate-startup engagement forms and to choose the most suitable 
form of startup activity for their company. In addition, the purposes and favorable aspects of 
startup activity engagement may help the managers to perceive and plan what could be 
achieved through startup activity engagement.  
 
The study suggests that established companies experience encountering and finding suitable 
startups as a challenge. Finding potential startups to collaborate with is crucial for most forms 
of startup activity engagement, especially for the external and collaborative forms. In order to 
facilitate the encountering and finding startups, a practical managerial implication could be 
that established companies could express their perception to startup activity in public: what 
kind of activity they are currently engaging in and what their plans for the future are. That 
way established companies could perhaps attract more startups which already know the 
engagement models the established company is interested in. As a result, the presumptions of 
both parties would be closer to each other. According to the study, the approaches to startup 
activity engagement vary greatly, so startups cannot know the views of the established 
companies if they do not express them. Established companies will benefit because they get 
more suitable references from startups. Other ways for encountering and finding startups are 
screening markets or technologies which are important for the strategic direction of the 
company, attending startup events, and own networks.  
 
If the established company wants to proceed in startup activity, the study suggests that not 
only the support but also the strong will and aims of the top management is vital. The 
importance of top management is also supported by both previous theoretical and empirical 
evidence. Furthermore, the study suggests that extending startup activity engagement is 
possible mainly through achieving success in current engagement and hence gaining 
justification for extended and diversified startup activity. The time span of the demanded 
success or the nature of the success was not defined. 
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However, succeeding in startup activities and gaining varied benefits of it is not unambiguous. 
For instance, if the startups are considered to be partners among others, it is conceivable that 
not all the benefits of startup collaboration are experienced. The study suggests that strategic 
exploiters make the most of startup activity, that they recognize the most benefits and that 
their engagement is the most extensive and most designed. It is therefore possible that 
companies engaging only narrowly in startup activities may not experience the same benefits. 
Achieving and experiencing benefits of startup activity engagement might also be a question 
of expectations and ambitions the managers of established companies set for startup activity 
engagement. If the expectations and ambitions are not set appropriately high, the resources 
allocated to startup activity may be low and thus also the experienced positive outcomes of 
startup activity may be restricted. 
 
The study suggests that the phenomenon of startup activities of established companies is 
neither industry nor technology specific. According to the findings, companies from varying 
industries are able to benefit from startup activity. The research suggests that startups may 
offer established companies other advantages than only technologies and technological 
innovations: such as development of modus operandi or service innovations. Furthermore, 
according to the study, established companies from any industry may exploit technology 
startups in their own targets of application. Corporate-startup engagement is previously 
studied academically only in the context of technology industries (Kohler, 2016; Weiblen & 
Chesbrough, 2015). Hence, this research suggests academic evidence that corporate 
entrepreneurship may be engaged through startup activities also in other industries. 
 
5.3 Limitations 
 
I have conducted this study only from the perspective of established companies. Because of 
this the perspective of startups or other relevant parties, such as incubators or investors, is not 
studied. Therefore, this study does not explore the relationship of the collaborating 
organizations but the perspective of one part of the collaborative activity. Neither does the 
study represent any objective or bilateral descriptions of the topics, since the objective is to 
explain solely the perspective of established companies. My descriptions of the phenomenon 
are therefore unilateral and startups and other parties may have completely different 
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perspectives on the matters. Thus, this master’s thesis does not extrapolate any of its 
suggestions to startups or any other parties of startup activities. 
 
The limitations regarding the empirical materials include using empirical consultative reports. 
The methodology, theoretical thinking and main purposes behind these reports is partly 
unknown. Thus, I have analyzed these materials critically and employed them only as 
complementary and comparative materials, not as the basis of my analysis. 
 
5.4 Suggestions for further research 
 
In this study I have presented only the perspective of established companies. Since the 
perspective of startups and third parties which may be involved in startup activity engagement 
is lacking, a study applying the suggested framework of startup activities could be conducted 
from the perspective of startups. From the perspective of established companies, a study 
following the development of startup activity engagement would generate novel company-
specific information on how startup activity engagement evolves. This could be done by 
following all of the companies or only one category, such as special know-how exploiters. 
 
Even though the research materials are fairly diverse and extensive, they do not allow 
generalization of the findings. The results only apply to the companies in question. Thus, I 
suggest further research with the same research frame, but with more extensive materials, for 
example international ones. In the same way, the research frame could be separately applied 
to particular industries in order to specifically analyze the possible differences between 
industries, for example if the maturity of startup activity engagement varies among industries. 
 
This qualitative research has been descriptive and mapping by nature. Quantitative research 
on the engagement in startup activities, the financial extent of startup activity and the profits 
of startup activity engagement would be useful in order to explore the same questions in terms 
of financial matters. Lastly, this research has explored the interface of corporate 
entrepreneurship and startup activity engagement. Since this interface has been in focus of 
only few corporate entrepreneurship studies, it could be studied further in order to better 
understand the timely empirical manifestation form of corporation entrepreneurship. 
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APPENDIXES 
 
 
Appendix 1: Translated interview guide 
 
 
0 Practicalities 
Research subject. Definitions: startup, startup activity. 
The topics of the interview. 
Allowance for sharing the interview data in terms of research collaboration. 
Allowance for recording. 
The preference of how to be referred by industry. 
 
 
1 Background information 
Could you firstly tell about your position, role and responsibilities? 
 
 
2 The startup activities of the company ____________ 
What and what kind of startup activities does the company ________ conduct? 
 
For how long have you been conducting? 
How are the activities conducted in practice? 
What has been easy? Difficult? / Successful? Unsuccessful? 
What is the time span of the activities? 
 What has been the reason for moving on from the trial stage? 
 Because of which factors has moving on been possible? 
 
 
3 Why startup activities? 
Why do you conduct startup activity in the first place? 
 
Why startup activity and not some other solution? Why is it better? 
What are the advantages? And the resistance? 
Has it been the right choice? 
 
 
4 Importance for business 
How do you estimate the importance of your startup activities on your entire current business? 
 
And in the future? 
How has the startup activity influenced your organization? 
How does the startup activity show in the agenda of top management? 
 
 
5 Additional notions 
Do you have anything else on your mind regarding this topic? 
 
 
